Pablo Defi

CertiK2 addresses on Ethereum

CertiK reviewed Pablo DeFi on 2 Jan 2024: 10 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 6 open.

No open critical findings
Open Pablo DeFi’s security record

The original report was removed from its address (seen 18 Oct 2026).

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Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High400
Medium001
Low203
HighCentralization Risks in PABLOToken.solOpen

In the contract `ERC20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, changing fee, pair and staking address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9dc1-756d7260-a9ce-35b3fe42d18b/diagrams/centralization_PABLOToken-ERC20-_owner.svg) In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9dc1-756d7260-a9ce-35b3fe42d18b/diagrams/centralization_PABLOToken-Ownable-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks with Collected FeeOpen

The `PABLOToken` contract will transfer the collected fees to the owner address when the `PABLOStaking` is set to 0. Any compromise to the owner address may allow a hacker to transfer those tokens from the address, resulting in severe damage to the project.

HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the `PABLO` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

HighUnknown Usage of Collected FeeOpen

The `PABLOToken` contract will accumulate fees and then transfer the fees to owner address or `PABLOStaking`. This is a popular design for deflationary token. As for the collected fee, some deflationary tokens (e.g. Safemoon) adds it to to the liquidity pool to be locked forever. On the other hand, `PABLOToken` simply transfers those fees directly to `_owner` and `PABLOStaking` for unclear usage, thus adding to the centralization risk.

LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FOpen

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

LowThird-Party Dependency UsageOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=353 address public PABLOStaking = address(0); ``` - The contract `ERC20` interacts with third party contract with `PabloStake` interface via `PABLOStaking`.

Contracts in scope2

AddressChainSource code
0x926ff6584b5905cc793cfb19bfc0ad6443671f47Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source
0x89dbfd81c99cad2c6cb2c374a5622dd1135efaafChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Part of Pablo DeFi’s security record

Pablo DeFi
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Pablo DeFi’s security record

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CertiK

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