Futster contract 0xab87…ba36 on Polygon (POS)

0xab87d8a7851945fe3399305fe144a377c9e9ba36

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xab87d8a7851945fe3399305fe144a377c9e9ba36 on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Futster. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 20 Sep 2022. 2 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
FutsterCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports2

1 High, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksFutster · CertiKOpen

In the contract `Futster.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setDefaultRoyalty() - function setTokenRoyalty() - function setBaseURI() - function setURISuffix() - function pause() - function unpause() - function safeMint() - function setDna() - function setOwner() In the contract `AccessControlled.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setAuthority() Any compromise to the `Governor` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority, e.g. Minting arbitrary ERC-721 tokens or changing the BaseURI of the Futster tokens.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowRedundant CodeFutster · CertiKOpen

The override function `_burn()` in `Futster.sol` acts the same with the function `_burn()` in `ERC721Royalty.sol` thus it is redundant.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Futster security record · Every Futster address · This address on the explorer