Futster audit reports

Polygon (POS)futster.io

Futster has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 28 Oct 2022; 1 critical finding, marked fixed by the firm. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across the 2 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm5

Statuses are the security firms’ own

5 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 low (all open).

High
2
Low
3
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Futster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` Me

    Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Variables That Could Be Declared as Immutable

    Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Redundant Code

    Futster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Futster Token - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 2 addresses on Polygon (POS)1 critical finding, fixedFindings: 1 critical · 1 high · 2 low
1 fixed · 3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
FutsterSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on Polygon (POS)None openFindings: 1 high · 4 low
3 fixed · 2 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High200
Medium000
Low303
HighCentralization Related RisksFutster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022Open

In the contract `FutToken`, fund addresses, for example, `funds[PRIVATE_SALE].fundAddress` can update its address via function `setPrivateSaleAddress()`, and the function would trigger transfer function to transfer the fund address's tokens to the new address. Same for the following functions: - `setPublicSaleAddress()`: update `funds[PUBLIC_SALE].fundAddress` - `setStakingRewardsAddress()`: update `funds[STAKING_REWARDS].fundAddress` - `setGamingIssuanceAddress()`: update `funds[GAMING_ISSUANCE].fundAddress` - `setSoccerClubsAddress()`: update `funds[SOCCER_CLUBS].fundAddress` - `setFutsterTeamAddress()`: update `funds[FUTSTER_TEAM].fundAddress` - `setPreLaunchFundAddress()`: update `funds[PRE_LAUNCH_FUND].fundAddress` - `setAdvisorsAddress()`: update `funds[ADVISORS].fundAddress` Any compromise to the fund addresses may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the addresses and transfer tokens out.

Open the report
HighCentralization Related RisksFutster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022Open

In the contract `Futster.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setDefaultRoyalty() - function setTokenRoyalty() - function setBaseURI() - function setURISuffix() - function pause() - function unpause() - function safeMint() - function setDna() - function setOwner() In the contract `AccessControlled.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setAuthority() Any compromise to the `Governor` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority, e.g. Minting arbitrary ERC-721 tokens or changing the BaseURI of the Futster tokens.

Open the report
LowPotential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` MeFutster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022Open

Current `FUTToken` implementation is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.

Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableFutster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022Open

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

Open the report
LowRedundant CodeFutster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022Open

The override function `_burn()` in `Futster.sol` acts the same with the function `_burn()` in `ERC721Royalty.sol` thus it is redundant.

Open the report

Contracts3

AddressChainSource code
0xab87d8a7851945fe3399305fe144a377c9e9ba36Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0xb25432e551d10025e00285141b3b6c3845f2a34fChain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0xf99afeae616316d73ba920f0b96cc849d1b2f93fChain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Futster: questions

Is Futster audited?

Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Futster, dated 20 Sep 2022 to 28 Oct 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Futster Token - Audit”).

Who audited Futster?

CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Futster.

Are there open findings in Futster’s audits?

5 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 low (all open). Of 1 critical finding: marked fixed by the firm. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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