Futster has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 28 Oct 2022; 1 critical finding, marked fixed by the firm. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
5 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 low (all open).
Centralization Related Risks
Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
Futster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Potential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` Me
Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Variables That Could Be Declared as Immutable
Futster Token - Audit · CertiK · 28 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Redundant Code
Futster · CertiK · 20 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Futster Token - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 2 addresses on Polygon (POS) | 1 critical finding, fixed | Findings: 1 critical · 1 high · 2 low 1 fixed · 3 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Futster | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Polygon (POS) | None open | Findings: 1 high · 4 low 3 fixed · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 3 | 0 | 3 |
In the contract `FutToken`, fund addresses, for example, `funds[PRIVATE_SALE].fundAddress` can update its address via function `setPrivateSaleAddress()`, and the function would trigger transfer function to transfer the fund address's tokens to the new address. Same for the following functions: - `setPublicSaleAddress()`: update `funds[PUBLIC_SALE].fundAddress` - `setStakingRewardsAddress()`: update `funds[STAKING_REWARDS].fundAddress` - `setGamingIssuanceAddress()`: update `funds[GAMING_ISSUANCE].fundAddress` - `setSoccerClubsAddress()`: update `funds[SOCCER_CLUBS].fundAddress` - `setFutsterTeamAddress()`: update `funds[FUTSTER_TEAM].fundAddress` - `setPreLaunchFundAddress()`: update `funds[PRE_LAUNCH_FUND].fundAddress` - `setAdvisorsAddress()`: update `funds[ADVISORS].fundAddress` Any compromise to the fund addresses may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the addresses and transfer tokens out.
Open the reportIn the contract `Futster.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setDefaultRoyalty() - function setTokenRoyalty() - function setBaseURI() - function setURISuffix() - function pause() - function unpause() - function safeMint() - function setDna() - function setOwner() In the contract `AccessControlled.sol`, the role `Governor` has authority over the following functions: - function setAuthority() Any compromise to the `Governor` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority, e.g. Minting arbitrary ERC-721 tokens or changing the BaseURI of the Futster tokens.
Open the reportCurrent `FUTToken` implementation is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the reportThe override function `_burn()` in `Futster.sol` acts the same with the function `_burn()` in `ERC721Royalty.sol` thus it is redundant.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xab87…ba360xab87d8a7851945fe3399305fe144a377c9e9ba36 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xb254…a34f0xb25432e551d10025e00285141b3b6c3845f2a34f | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xf99a…f93f0xf99afeae616316d73ba920f0b96cc849d1b2f93f | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Futster, dated 20 Sep 2022 to 28 Oct 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Futster Token - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Futster.
5 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 low (all open). Of 1 critical finding: marked fixed by the firm. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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