Futster Token - Audit

CertiK2 addresses on Polygon (POS)

CertiK reviewed Futster (Futster Token - Audit) on 28 Oct 2022: 4 findings, 1 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 open.

1 critical finding, fixed
Open the reportOpen Futster’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High100
Medium000
Low200
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `FutToken`, fund addresses, for example, `funds[PRIVATE_SALE].fundAddress` can update its address via function `setPrivateSaleAddress()`, and the function would trigger transfer function to transfer the fund address's tokens to the new address. Same for the following functions: - `setPublicSaleAddress()`: update `funds[PUBLIC_SALE].fundAddress` - `setStakingRewardsAddress()`: update `funds[STAKING_REWARDS].fundAddress` - `setGamingIssuanceAddress()`: update `funds[GAMING_ISSUANCE].fundAddress` - `setSoccerClubsAddress()`: update `funds[SOCCER_CLUBS].fundAddress` - `setFutsterTeamAddress()`: update `funds[FUTSTER_TEAM].fundAddress` - `setPreLaunchFundAddress()`: update `funds[PRE_LAUNCH_FUND].fundAddress` - `setAdvisorsAddress()`: update `funds[ADVISORS].fundAddress` Any compromise to the fund addresses may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the addresses and transfer tokens out.

LowPotential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` MeOpen

Current `FUTToken` implementation is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.

LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

Contracts in scope2

AddressChainSource code
0xb25432e551d10025e00285141b3b6c3845f2a34fChain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0xf99afeae616316d73ba920f0b96cc849d1b2f93fChain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Part of Futster’s security record

Futster
Audits2 audits by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 2 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Futster’s security record

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