Elvishmagic

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Elvish Magic (Elvishmagic) on 12 Sep 2023: 8 findings, 0 critical; 2 acknowledged, 6 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Elvish Magic’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium000
Low600
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `ElvishMagic2` (both the ETH & BSC versions) the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * removeSellFee() - Remove sell fees charged for transfers to the LP pair address * changeMarketingWallet() - Change marketing wallet address * claimStuckTokens() - Transfer external tokens within contract to contract owner address * removeWalletToWalletTransferFee() - Remove fees charged for inter-wallet transfers * setSwapTokensAtAmount() - Set threshold at which swaps for BNB are executed * enableTrading() - Enable transfers of the tokens between non-fee exempt parties * setSwapWithLimit() - Set limit to the amount of tokens processed in swaps to BNB * excludeFromFees() - Add address to fee exemption list * removeBuyFee() - Remove buy fees charged for transfers from the LP pair address Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to control fees, fee exemptions, and swapping of tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce807066ea5a445fb880ee436a2cdc6c/diagrams/centralization_ElvishMagic2-ElvishMagic2-_owner.svg) In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below. * renounceOwnership() - Give up contract ownership and set owner to address zero * transferOwnership() - Transfer contract ownership to another address Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to control contract ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce807066ea5a445fb880ee436a2cdc6c/diagrams/centralization_ElvishMagic2-Ownable-_owner.svg)

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the `EMAGIC` tokens are sent to the set contract owner at the deployment of the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous contract owner can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the owner account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • EMAGIC_ETH.sol
  • EMAGIC_BSC.sol

Part of Elvish Magic’s security record

Elvish Magic
Audits4 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Sep 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open Elvish Magic’s security record

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