EGO

In the contract `EgoToken` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the critical configuration of the contract, and move funds.  In the contract `EgoToken` the role `PAUSER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `PAUSER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause and unpause the project. 

In the contract `Staking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify critical configurations of the contract. 

All **EGO** tokens are sent to the "validator" address when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute the tokens without the consensus of the community.

The "EgoERC20GotBit.sol" serves as the underlying entity to interact with third-party **Axelar Library and system**. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. Additionally, In the "EgoERC20GotBit.sol" contract, two functions, "transferRemote" and "_execute," check if the message is signed by the validator. The validator is a complete black box, and the auditor cannot determine the behavior of the validator or how it decides if it should sign a message. The validator and it's code logic is out of the scope of the audit.