NimbusPlatform ET - NFT

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Nimbus Platform (NimbusPlatform ET - NFT) on 30 Sep 2022: 22 findings, 0 critical; 18 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

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Findings22

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High042
Medium003
Low0013
HighCentralization Risks in HubRouting.solAcknowledged

In the contract `HubRouting` the role `StakingMain` has authority over the functions **stake**, **registerSet**, **withdrawReward** and **burn** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `StakingMain` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and stake the tokens to his/her desired addresses, register the set when the tokens are purchased, withdraw the reward to his/her desired account, and also burn/destroy the tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_HubRouting-HubRouting-StakingMain.svg) In the contract `HubRouting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions **activateSet** and **deactivateSet** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and activate and deactivate set when the tokens are purchased. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_HubRouting-HubRouting-_owner.svg) In the contract `HubRouting` the role `owner` has authority over the functions **deactivateSet** and **activateSet** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and deactivate and activate set when the tokens are purchased. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_HubRouting-HubRouting-owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in StakingMain.solAcknowledged

In the contract `StakingMain` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions **setHubRouting**, **addSet**, and **rescue** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the hub for routing, add the stakers in the set, and rescue the tokens to the desired address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingMain-StakingMain-_owner.svg) In the contract `StakingMain` the role `owner` has authority over the functions **setHubRouting**, **rescue**, **approve**, and **addSet** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the hub for routing, rescue the tokens to the desired address, add the stakers in the set, and approve the transfer of tokens to the desired address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingMain-StakingMain-owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in StakingSet.solAcknowledged

In the contract `StakingSet` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions **rescue**, **updateNimbusRouter**, **updateTokenAllowance**, **updateNbuStaking**, **initialize**, **updateGnbuStaking**, **updateCakeStaking**, **updateMinPurchaseAmount**, **setCakePID**, and **setLockTime** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and rescue the tokens to the desired address, update Nimbus Router once new address is received, update Nimbus Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, initialize the addresses to the desired value, update Gnbu Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, update Cake Staking once new address for `newCakeCasting` is received, increase or decrease the minimum purchase amount, set cake PID and set lock time. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSet-StakingSet-_owner.svg) In the contract `StakingSet` the role `hubRouting` has authority over the functions **withdrawUserRewards**, **burnStakingSet**, and **buyStakingSet** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `hubRouting` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw the rewards from user to his/her desired account, and buy as well as destroy the staking set. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSet-StakingSet-hubRouting.svg) In the contract `StakingSet` the role `owner` has authority over the functions **rescue**, **updateNimbusRouter**, **updateTokenAllowance**, **updateNbuStaking**, **initialize**, **updateGnbuStaking**, **updateCakeStaking**, **updateMinPurchaseAmount**, **setCakePID**, and **setLockTime** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and rescue the tokens to the desired address, update Nimbus Router once new address is received, update Nimbus Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, initialize the addresses to the desired value, update Gnbu Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, update Cake Staking once new address for `newCakeCasting` is received, increase or decrease the minimum purchase amount, set cake PID and set lock time. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSet-StakingSet-owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in StakingSetBusd.solAcknowledged

In the contract `StakingSetBusd` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions **updateCakeStaking**, **updateNbuStaking**, **initialize**, **updateGnbuStaking**, **updateNimbusRouter**, **rescue**, **updateTokenAllowance**, **setCakePID**, **setLockTime**, **updateMinPurchaseAmount** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update Cake Staking once new address for `newCakeCasting` is received, update Nimbus Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, initialize the addresses to the desired value, update Gnbu Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, update Nimbus Router once new address is received, rescue the tokens to the desired address, update token allowances, increase or decrease the minimum purchase amount, set cake PID and set lock time. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSetBusd-StakingSetBusd-_owner.svg) In the contract `StakingSetBusd` the role `hubRouting` has authority over the functions **withdrawUserRewards**, **burnStakingSet**, and **buyStakingSet** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `hubRouting` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw the rewards from user to his/her desired account, and buy as well as destroy the staking set. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSetBusd-StakingSetBusd-hubRouting.svg) In the contract `StakingSetBusd` the role `owner` has authority over the functions **updateNbuStaking**, **updateCakeStaking**, **initialize**, **updateNimbusRouter**, **updateGnbuStaking**, **updateMinPurchaseAmount**, **setCakePID**, **setLockTime**, **updateTokenAllowance**, and **rescue** shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update Nimbus Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, update Cake Staking once new address for `newCakeCasting` is received, initialize the addresses to the desired value, update Nimbus Router once new address is received, update Gnbu Staking once new address for `newLpStaking` is received, increase or decrease the minimum purchase amount, set cake PID, set lock time, update token allowances, and rescue the tokens to the desired address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/7ea8d5b6cd4a4dc9800c61acb40b3c9f/diagrams/centralization_StakingSetBusd-StakingSetBusd-owner.svg)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (6)

  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/StakingSet.sol
  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/StakingMain.sol
  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/StakingSetBusd.sol
  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/StakingSetStorage.sol
  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/StakingSetProxy.sol
  • contracts/contracts_BSC/dApps/NFTTokens/SmartStaker/HubRouting.sol

Part of Nimbus Platform’s security record

Nimbus Platform
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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