FreeCity

In the contract `FreeCityGame_v2` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do any of the following: - change the `OpenSea` address to a potentially malicious address - edit attributes of an NFT to their benefit - add or remove addresses he/she controls to the whitelist and gain privileged roles - update a token's royalty to their benefit  In the contract `FreeCityGame_v2` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create, update, and open blind boxes, which contain mystery NFTs that they can then withdraw and keep for their benefit.  In the contract `FreeCityGame_v2` the role `whilteAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `whilteAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint NFTs to the blind boxes.  ---- In the contract `MyToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint an unlimited amount of tokens to an address he/she controls. 

In the contract `AuthenticatedProxy` the role `user` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `user` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create proxies from potentially malicious contract he/she controls, as well as revoke an address ProxyRegistry access.  ---- In the contract `FreeCityProxyRegistry` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant an address he/she controls ProxyRegistry access.  ---- In the contract `ProxyRegistry` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and revoke addresses ProxyRegistry access.  ---- In the contract `ExchangeCore` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the protocol fee to an amount that can disrupt contract functionality, while also changing the protocol fee recipient to an address he/she controls in order to steal all the fees.  ---- In the contract `OwnedUpgradeabilityProxy` the role `proxyOwner` has authority over the following functions: - `transferProxyOwnership()` - `upgradeTo()` - `upgradeToAndCall()` Any compromise to the `proxyOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer proxy ownership to an address he/she controls in order to upgrade the current implementation of the proxy and delegate call the new implementation for initialization, which can be a potentially malicious contract.

The cited contract is upgradeable, meaning the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, he/she can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.