Honorworld - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Honor World Token (Honorworld - Audit) on 10 Oct 2022: 13 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Honor World Token’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings13

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High040
Medium000
Low306
HighCentralization Risks in HWTToken.solAcknowledged

In the contract `HWTToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the mainPool address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_HWTToken-HWTToken-_owner.svg) In the contract `HWTToken` the role `mainPool` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `mainPool` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint HWT to an arbitrary address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_HWTToken-HWTToken-mainPool.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in LPStaking.solAcknowledged

In the contract `LPStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add new liquidity pools and modify the allocation points of the existing ones. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_LPStaking-LPStaking-_owner.svg) In the contract `LPStaking` the role `devAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `devAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to change the `devAddress` address, which receives fees when a withdrawal takes place. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_LPStaking-LPStaking-devAddress.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in NFTStaking.solAcknowledged

In the contract `NFTStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set `ApprovedMinter` and `ApprovedOperator` roles, as well as the AuraRule address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_NFTStaking-NFTStaking-_owner.svg) -------------------------------- The role `ApprovedMinter` has the authority to function `directStake()` to stake token on other user's behalf. The role `ApprovedOperator` has the authority to the following functions to manage NFT tokens' ownership: - `escrowOwnership()` - `restoreOwnership()` - `transferOwnership()` Any compromise to the `ApprovedMinter` or `ApprovedOperator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and stake or lock user's NFT tokens without their consent.

HighCentralization Risks in StrategyPSC.solAcknowledged

In the contract `StrategyPSC` the role `devAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `devAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set `devAddress`, which receives the dev fees. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_StrategyPSC-StrategyPSC-devAddress.svg) In the contract `StrategyPSC` the role `govAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `govAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set multiple important addresses and disrupt normal contract process by pause/unpause. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_StrategyPSC-StrategyPSC-govAddress.svg) In the contract `StrategyPSC` the role `harvestAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `harvestAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and take control over harvest and earn process. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/08835400601f4ebe8077fffe7e9921f8/diagrams/centralization_StrategyPSC-StrategyPSC-harvestAddress.svg)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (4)

  • contracts/LPStaking.sol
  • contracts/StrategyPSC.sol
  • contracts/HWTToken.sol
  • contracts/NFTStaking.sol

Part of Honor World Token’s security record

Honor World Token
Audits2 audits by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
Open Honor World Token’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,044 projects reviewed · 1,375 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us