Mazimatic - New Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Mazimatic (Mazimatic - New Audit) on 27 Mar 2023: 20 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Mazimatic’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings20

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium002
Low4014
LowDiscussion on disabling antisnipingOpen

The function `setAntisnipeDisable()` is set in a way that the flag `antisnipeDisable` (that has a default value of false) can only be set as `true` once by the owner. ```solidity function setAntisnipeDisable() external onlyOwner { require(!antisnipeDisable); antisnipeDisable = true; } ``` The audit team would like to check if this is intended and whether there should be a method to toggle between turning on and off the `antisnipeDisable` flag.

LowLogic behind `liquidityTimestamp`Open

The audit team would like to better understand how the `liquidityTimestamp` is used. In the following codeblock, it is used to determine the eventual value of `amount2` in function `_transfer()`. ```solidity=138 if (to == pairAddress && liquidityTimestamp != 0) { if (block.timestamp < liquidityTimestamp + 24 hours) { return (amount * 1000) / 10000; } else if ( liquidityTimestamp + 24 hours < block.timestamp && block.timestamp < liquidityTimestamp + 48 hours ) { return (amount * 500) / 10000; } return 0; ``` Once the `liquidityTimestamp` has passed, the value of `amount2` will always be 0, therefore the value of `liquidityTimestamp` must be reset to another value to re-enable the other conditions. The audit team would like to check if this aligns with the intended design.

LowPossible Bypass the `_botManager()` handling forOpen

The logic currently only manages one `pairAddress()` which is the one that is created in the `initialize()` function of the contract. If other users create new uniswap pair addresses, the amount handling in the `_botManager()` will be bypassed. The audit team would like to know if this implementation matches the intended design.

LowPossible DoS Situation Due to `coolDownTime` MechOpen

The MaziToken implemented a cool down mechanism, meaning that two consecutive token transfers within certain time interval may cause the second transfer to revert. For example, if the token is used in a vault contract, the withdraw function may need to invoke the two transfers (the first time to transfer fees and the second time to transfer tokens to users), which may lead to a potential revert of the function and prevent withdrawals. Therefore, the token may be not compatible with many protocols.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Repository and files the report names (1)

  • MaziToken.sol

Part of Mazimatic’s security record

Mazimatic
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Mar 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Mazimatic’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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