Quantstamp reviewed StakeStone on 25 Jul 2024: 6 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged; 1 more marked mitigated.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
Marked Undetermined or Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The function `_depositFor()` compares the price obtained from the call to `currentSharePrice()` with that of the previous round to adjust for the best of both. The same comparison is not performed in`rollToNextRound()` while calculating `amountToWithdraw`, which may not be desirable.
`StrategyController.forceWithdraw()` makes a call to `Strategy(strategy).instantWithdraw(withAmount)`. This function is expected to withdraw whatever funds possible and not revert (as opposed to `StrategyController._withdrawFromStrategy()` calling `Strategy(_strategy).withdraw(_amount)`). However, none of the current implementations of `Strategy.instantWithdraw()` correctly gather the requested funds. * `NativeLendingETHStrategy.instantWithdraw()`: Leaves potential funds in the LP token. * `SymbioticDepositWstETHStrategy.instantWithdraw()`: Is unable to syncronously withdraw additional ETH as it needs to submit withdrawal requests from Lido. * `EigenLSTRestaking.instantWithdraw()`: Is unable to syncronously withdraw additional ETH as it needs to submit withdrawal requests from Lido. All three of these functions will revert if the amount withdrawn exceeds the amount of ETH in the contract. With the current usages, this could prevent some users from being able to call `StoneVault.instantWithdraw()`. Additionally, it is possible for the implementations of `Strategy.withdraw()` to revert as well. This could result in blocking calls to `StrategyController._rebase()` until the admin makes the ETH available for each of the strategies. This will in turn prevent calls to `StoneVault.rollToNextRound()`.
The constructor in the `Account` contract has the following line: ``` controller = EigenStrategy(address(this)).controller(); ``` Rather than referring to an outside contract, `EigenStrategy` wraps `address(this)`. The `controller` variable is effectively assigned to itself and will remain zero, leading all calls to the controller in `invoke()` to revert. Additionally, `invoke()` may arbitrarily execute external contract calls when `value` equals zero.
Voters stake their STONE into the `Proposal` contract under the pretense that they can withdraw their STONE after the proposal has completed. Executing a proposal involves calling `Proposal.invoke()`, which calls `stoneVault.call{value: 0}(data)`. If a proposal passes that calls `StoneVault.requestWithdraw()`, it will use the STONE that was staked by voters into the `Proposal` contract. This will make it impossible to return STONE to all voters. Given this exploit scenario would have to be approved by voters, the severity has been left as Informational.
The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.
Repository and files the report names (36)
240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
See Quantstamp’s auditsSomething wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us