Pepa

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed Pepa Inu (Pepa) on 23 May 2023: 16 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 13 open.

No open critical findings
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Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium011
Low1200
HighCentralization Risks in AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorFixed

In the contract `AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a5060626835449c5ac6cd9c93a0fd0c9/diagrams/centralization_AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken-AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - function excludeFromFee(): exclude addresses from paying fees. - function excludeFromReward(): exclude addresses from reward(reflect mechanism). - function includeInReward(): include addresses for reward(reflect mechanism). - function setTaxFeePercent(): set tax fee percent. - function setLiquidityFeePercent(): set liquidity fee percent. - function setCharityFeePercent(): set charity fee percent. - function setSwapBackSettings(): change the value of `numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity`(swap threshold). - function setEnableAntiBot(): change the value of `enableAntiBot` which controls whether to call a third-party anti-bot checker before token transfer. In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a5060626835449c5ac6cd9c93a0fd0c9/diagrams/centralization_AntiBotLiquidityGeneratorToken-Ownable-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - function transferOwnership(): transfer the `_owner` role to another account. - function renounceOwnership(): change the `_owner` address to address(0).

MediumVariable `_rOwned[account]` Not Updated in FunctiFixed

```solidity function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() { require(_isExcluded[account], "Account is already included"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } } ``` Variable `_rOwned[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders. The Rate was higher at the moment of the `excludeFromReward(account)` call, so the `_rOwned[account] / _tOwned[account]` ratio is bigger than expected for accounts included in the reward.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0xc3137c696796d69f783cd0be4ab4bb96814234aaChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of Pepa Inu’s security record

Pepa Inu
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit May 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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Security firm

CertiK

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