CertiK reviewed ChainPort Cross-Chain Bridge (Chainport (Sol part)) on 26 Jan 2023: 18 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged, 10 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| Medium | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 8 | 0 | 2 |
The deposit and release functions only check if the token to be deposited is frozen. An attacker can call the deposit or release function with a malicious contract as input of the `token` parameter, emit an event "TokensDeposited(address(usdt), attacker, 1000 ether, 56)" in the `balanceOf()`/`safeTransfer()` function of the malicious contract. It is possible that this event will be accepted by the Chainport cross-chain system. If this happens, the attacker can withdraw tokens without depositing any token and drain the pool.
Comparison `taxPercent >= 0` that is always true may be unnecessary. ```solidity=311 require(taxPercent >= 0 && taxPercent <= precision, "Tax override value"); ```
The given input is missing the check to ensure the `originNetworkId` is not the `officialNetworkId`.
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Repository and files the report names (4)
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