Wemix Retainer #22 (FT Staking V2)

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer #22 (FT Staking V2)) on 28 Apr 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium200
Low201
Medium`shutDown()` Function Allows Owner to Transfer AlOpen

The `shutDown()` function in the `SPRevenue` and `SPSchedule` contracts allow the Owner account to transfer all `rt` and `st` tokens from the respective vault to any arbitrary owner designated address (when all IDs are paused). While it could be useful as an emergency rescue method, if the Owner account is ever compromised, the entire token balance at the `rtVault` and `stVault` could be at risk of being drained.

MediumPotential Compounder Migration RiskOpen

The `setCompounder()` function allows the contract owner to change the `compounder` address. In the `_compound()` function, this contract approves the `compounder` address of maximum `rt` amount. If the Owner account is compromised, or if the `compounder` address does not function as intended, users' reward can be lost.

LowMissing Emit EventsOpen

Functions that update state variables should emit relevant events as notifications.

LowThird Party and Out of Scope DependenciesOpen

The in-scope contracts interact with several third-party or out-of-scope contracts, including PlaySwapRouter, PlaySwapFactory, RecipientRoleV6, etc. The audit treats third-party entities and out-of-scope dependencies as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, they can be compromised, which may lead to lost or stolen assets.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (23)

  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPMineSchedule.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPLimit.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/base/SPBase.sol
  • SampleContract/StakingPoolV2/SampleSPSchedule.sol
  • Standard/StakingPool/SPRevenue.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPBase.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/option/SPCoolTime.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/core/SPMineSchedule.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/option/SPMultiPoint.sol
  • SampleContract/StakingPoolV2/SampleSPRevenue.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/base/calculator/SPKCalculator.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPCoolTime.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/option/SPLimit.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPMineRevenue.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPMultiPoint.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/base/SPLib.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/core/SPMineRevenue.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPCore.sol
  • Standard/StakingPool/SPSchedule.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/interface/ISPLockUp.sol
  • System/compounder/Compounder.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/base/calculator/SPFeeCalculator.sol
  • Common/staking/v2/option/SPLockUp.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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CertiK

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