PEPEF

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed PEPE FLOKI (PEPEF) on 12 May 2023: 11 findings, 0 critical; 3 acknowledged, 8 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen PEPE FLOKI’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium000
Low800
HighCentralization Risks in PEPEFLOKI.solAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d0058e4fb252468e8cc1ca9ace741b1e/diagrams/centralization_PEPEFLOKI-Ownable-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce/transfer ownership to the other address. --- In the contract `PEPEFLOKI` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d0058e4fb252468e8cc1ca9ace741b1e/diagrams/centralization_PEPEFLOKI-PEPEFLOKI-_owner.svg) - `claimStuckTokens()`: Claims stuck tokens in the contract, can only be called by the contract owner. - `excludeFromFees()`: Excludes or includes an account from fees, can only be called by the contract owner. - `enableTrading()`: Enables trading for the token, can only be called by the contract owner. - `setSwapEnabled()`: Sets the swapEnabled state, can only be called by the contract owner. - `setSwapTokensAtAmount()`: Sets the number of tokens to be swapped at once, can only be called by the contract owner. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project.

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All **PEPEF** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute **PEPEF** tokens without the consensus of the community.

HighSending Ether to Arbitrary DestinationsAcknowledged

```solidity=698 function swapAndSendMarketing(uint256 tokenAmount) private { uint256 initialBalance = address(this).balance; address[] memory path = new address[](2); path[0] = address(this); path[1] = uniswapV2Router.WETH(); uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp); uint256 newBalance = address(this).balance - initialBalance; payable(marketingWallet).sendValue(newBalance); emit SwapAndSendMarketing(tokenAmount, newBalance); } ``` The `swapAndSendMarketing()` function calls the `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` function to swap the `PEPEF` tokens to BNB and send the BNB to the `marketingWallet` address. As a result, over time the `marketingWallet` address will accumulate a significant portion BNB. If the `marketingWallet` is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), the mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences for the project as a whole. For the common deflationary token, the entire tokenomic requires certain liquidity to support. However, in the current implementation, the swapped BNB is transferred to `marketingWallet` and is not being used for adding liquidity. Therefore, the entire tokenomic may crash due to lacking enough liquidity in the BNB-PEPEF pool.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x4e2434294a722329b6b64e0c2fca51b2533d7015Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of PEPE FLOKI’s security record

PEPE FLOKI
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit May 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open PEPE FLOKI’s security record

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