OneRare V2

CertiK11 Jul 2022Files named in the report

Audit

CertiK reviewed OneRare (OneRare V2) on 11 Jul 2022: 9 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

No open critical findings

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Acknowledged	Fixed
Critical	0	0
High	3	2
Medium	0	1
Low	1	2

HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

**In the contract `ORareGame` the role `_owner` and `admin` have authority over the following functions:** - `updateDishLock()` - `addOrUpdateDishRecipe()` - `addOrUpdateMultipleDishRecipe()` - `createDish()` Any compromise to the privileged accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change dish NFT recipes or lock a dish. **In the contract `OneRareMarketplace` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-OneRareMarketplace-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change fee receiver address or drain the OrareNft tokens in the marketplace. **In the contract `ORareNft` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-ORareNft-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set arbitrary accounts as the game contract that can mint OrareNFT tokens. **In the contract `NftRewardVault` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-NftRewardVault-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. set the number of tokens available for distribution and set arbitrary accounts as whitelisted operators, which could interrupt NFT reward distribution in the staking contract. Stakers can not claim their staking rewards when the vault balance is insufficient. **In the contract `ORareNftStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-ORareNftStaking-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change the reward rate, set unbonding period, or close an open stake, which could interrupt the rewards distribution.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeAcknowledged

`ORareNftStaking`, `ORareGame`, and `OneRareMarketPlace` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

HighPrivileged Function Allows `Owner` to Withdraw alAcknowledged

Function `recoverERC20()` in `ORareNftStaking.sol` allows the controller of the contract owner to withdraw all of the `Orare` tokens staked in the `OneRareStaking` contract, which could lead to a rug pull.

LowFunction `getUnclaimedRewardsFor()` may return inAcknowledged

Function `getUnclaimedRewardsFor()` may return incorrect value when `updateRewardsPerSec()` is in process. In this case, for users that have been processed, `user.rewardDebt` is reset while `_accRewardPerShare` is not.