CertiK reviewed QMGF (QMGF-Audit) on 5 Jul 2023: 21 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 20 open.
The original report was removed from its address (seen 15 Oct 2026).
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 14 | 0 | 0 |
All of the QMGF tokens are sent to the `admin`. This is a centralization risk because the `admin` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
There are no upper boundaries for `setBuyFee()` and `setSellFee()` which are used to set buy/sell fees. It is possible to set the total fee rate up to any arbitrary amount. Misuse of these fee setting functions could damage the whole tokenomics. For example, the owner can set the fee rate to more than 100% to cause all transactions to revert.
In the `_transfer()` function, when users buy or sell the `QMGF` token through the `_uniswapV2Router`, the contract imposes a transaction fee. However, when the `pair.swap()` function is utilized for buying or selling `QMGF` tokens, transactions are executed without any charges.
In the function `takeNFTDivi()`, the function calculates the dividend for each NFT by dividing the total dividend `_nftAllDivi` by the total supply of the NFTs `NFT(_nft).totalSupply()`, However, it's important to note that the indexing for distributing the dividends starts from 2 (`_nftIndex`), as a result, NFT owners with an index less than 2 do not receive any tokens (`_token`) from the routing address (`_nftRouter`). Additionally, as the total supply of NFTs `(NFT(_nft).totalSupply())` increases, the calculated dividend per NFT (`everyNftDivi`) may end up being smaller than the already distributed dividend (`_nftAlreadyDivi`). This discrepancy can potentially cause the function to revert, disrupting the expected behavior.
At the last step of function `_transfer` will call `process` with default gas limitation `500000`. But there may be not enough 500 thousand gas till this step. EVM may revert this call and return the out-of-gas exception.
The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.
When the shareholder’s share is 0, the shareholder is removed from the `shareholders`, but the relevant data is not removed from `shareholderIndexes`, which may cause unexpected errors due to inconsistent data.
One or more parameters with `memory` data location are never modified in their functions and those functions are never called internally within the contract. Thus, their data location can be changed to `calldata` to avoid the gas consumption copying from calldata to memory. ```solidity=831 function setBatchBot(address[] memory accounts, bool value) ``` `setBatchBot` has memory location parameters: `accounts`.
The contract has a `receive()` function, making it able to receive native tokens. However, it does not have a function to withdraw the funds, which can lead to permanently locked tokens within the contract. ```solidity=544 receive() external payable {} ```
There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=853 _marketAddr = value; ``` - `value` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=976 _nft = value; ``` - `value` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=983 token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3, to, ~uint256(0))); ``` - `to` is not zero-checked before being used.
Performing division by zero would raise an error and revert the transaction. ```solidity=655 uint256 everyNftDivi = _nftAllDivi / NFT(_nft).totalSupply(); ``` The expression `_nftAllDivi / NFT(_nft).totalSupply()` may divide by zero. Its divisor has an estimated interval [0, 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935]. --- ```solidity=703 uint256 amount = tokenBal .mul( IERC20(_uniswapV2Pair).balanceOf( _shareholders[_currentIndex] ) ) .div(getLpTotal()); ``` The expression `tokenBal.mul(IERC20(_uniswapV2Pair).balanceOf(_shareholders[_currentIndex])).div(getLpTotal())` may divide by zero. Its divisor has an estimated interval [0, 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935].
A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: ```solidity=966 _uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, address(0xdead), block.timestamp ); ``` ```solidity=884 _uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, _router, block.timestamp ); ```
The linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either leftovers from test code or older functionality.
State variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=339 uint256 _distributorGas = 500000; ``` - `_distributorGas` should be declared `constant`.
In the `_transfer()` function, if either `_fromAddress` or `_toAddress` is not listed in `_isDividendExempt` and is not identical to `_uniswapV2Pair`, these addresses will be incorporated into `_shareholders`. Nevertheless, as depicted in lines 617 and 618, when `_fromAddress` or `_toAddress` doesn't equate to `address(0)`, these addresses maintain the from and to values from the previous `_transfer()` invocation, as opposed to those from the current operation. As a consequence, the `from` and `to` addresses from the last transaction does not become shareholders.
The return values of the `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` calls in the smart contract are not checked. Some ERC-20 tokens' transfer functions return no values, while others return a bool value, they should be handled with care. If a function returns `false` instead of reverting upon failure, an unchecked failed transfer could be mistakenly considered successful in the contract. ```solidity=666 IERC20(_token).transferFrom(_nftRouter, NFT(_nft).ownerOf(_nftIndex),tokenIdDivi); ``` --- ```solidity=797 IERC20(_rewardToken).transfer(_nftRouter, nftD); ``` --- ```solidity=798 IERC20(_rewardToken).transfer( _marketAddr, tokenBal.mul(_buyMarketingFee.add(_sellMarketingFee)).div( _denominator ) ); ``` --- ```solidity=804 IERC20(_rewardToken).transfer( _lpRouter, tokenBal.mul(_buyLpFee.add(_sellLpFee)).div(_denominator) ); ``` --- ```solidity=808 IERC20(_rewardToken).transfer( _marketRouter, IERC20(_rewardToken).balanceOf(address(this)) ); ``` --- ```solidity=891 IERC20(_token).transferFrom( _router, address(this), IERC20(_token).balanceOf(address(_router)) ); ``` --- ```solidity=954 IERC20(_token).transferFrom(_marketRouter, address(this), 500e18); ```
The low-level `call` function returns the status of the call as first variable in the returned tuple. The status of the `call` is not asserted to be `true`, which would treat the low-level call as a success even when it reverted. ```solidity=393 _token.call( abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3, _uniswapV2Router, ~uint256(0)) ); ``` --- ```solidity=983 token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3, to, ~uint256(0))); ```
The `SafeMath` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow. ```solidity=126 library SafeMath { ``` - An implementation of `SafeMath` library is found. --- ```solidity=304 using SafeMath for uint256; ``` - `SafeMath` library is used for `uint256` type in `GGGTOKEN` contract. ```solidity=354 _swapTokensAtAmount = _tTotal.mul(1).div(10**4); ``` - `SafeMath.mul` is called in `constructor` function of `GGGTOKEN` contract. *Note: Only a sample of 2 `SafeMath` library usage in this contract (out of 36) are shown above.*
The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xf193…33330xf193d0762cec3667c8d699dd13e4dd0310613333 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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