Managed Smart Contract Assessment

HalbornCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Audit · firm’s term: smart contract assessment

Halborn reviewed XMAQUINA (Managed Smart Contract Assessment) on 21 Sep 2026: 13 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 7 acknowledged.

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Report hosted on halborn.com.

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Findings46

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium021
Low055

Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalA reused library address from a previous build passes the deployment check and runs stale logic on every seriesAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalAn eligibility entry can be written with a practically infinite expiry, contradicting the no immortal entries ruleAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalCancelling notes during settlement, rolling back and declaring again raises every remaining holder's payout rateAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalClawback accepts the note's own address as destination, unlike every other destination setterAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalDuplicate wallets in one registry batch are accepted and the last row silently winsAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalNo floor on the certified completion date lets claims open in the issuance blockAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalPhase transition and engine change events do not record who actedAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe payout pool is credited before the tokens arrive, so a short delivery records a liability the escrow cannot payAcknowledged

The report gives no description here.

InformationalA series can be created with another series' escrow as its off ramp, stranding the swept raise in the wrong custody poolFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalA series can name its own escrow as the off ramp, so the sweep moves nothing and notes are issued against money that never leftFixed

The report gives no description here.

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InformationalA subscription end near the maximum timestamp overflows the deadline arithmetic and disables the permissionless fallbackFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalAn oversized settlement amount overflows the payout arithmetic and stalls every redemption until the declaration is rolled backFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalBurn NatSpec still describes the frozen shortfall release removed with the lock upFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalClosing redemption before any burn removes the only correction window for a wrong settlement basisFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalDeposit, claim and redemption each signal ineligibility differently despite the interface promiseFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalFallback buffers and the heartbeat step accept a one second value, which defeats the protections the zero check exists forFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalFive mutators still succeed on a terminal series that INV-12 does not listFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalIn kind deliveries lose the transfer tax and the exchanging holder receives fewer notes than agreedFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalIntegrator documentation misstates which parameters move after open and cites a validator that does not existFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalInterface documentation for claim delivery still describes the removed lock up freezeFixed

The report gives no description here.

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InformationalInterface text for issuance points at a mechanism the token replacedFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe compromise response table routes every recovery through a key that has no response row of its ownFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe deploy checklist states that RCMNote.forcedTransfer() reverts from the admin when it succeedsFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe escrow and admin role collision checks run only at initialisation and a later grant reestablishes what they rejectFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe factory accepts a role set that collides the admin with an operational role, and every series creation then failsFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe identity policy header states that the scale back gate is unbuilt when two of its three call sites are liveFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe implied upper bound on the overage cap scales with the square of the hardcap and provides no sanity checkFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe lens header claims every read is guarded by the escrow when two note reads are not, and safety rests on call orderFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe lens recomputes outstanding supply instead of reading the escrow's accessor for itFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe note's decimals are not validated against the settlement asset, so a wrong value misrepresents every balance for the life of the seriesFixed

The report gives no description here.

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InformationalThe operations role map omits the document engine as a fifth contract that grants rolesFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe parameter freeze holds by the absence of setters, not by the predicate that claims to define itFixed

The report gives no description here.

InformationalThe specification's pointer swap principle names two examples that are frozen in codeFixed

The report gives no description here.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Part of XMAQUINA’s security record

XMAQUINA
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2026, by Halborn.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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Halborn

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