IBStoken - Audit

CertiK1 address on Polygon (POS)

CertiK reviewed IBS (IBStoken - Audit) on 30 May 2024: 5 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen IBS’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium010
Low020
HighCentralization Risks in IBSToken.solAcknowledged

In the contract `Pausable` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause token transfers. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d07-19f5a400-b55e-a36ce29c2474/diagrams/centralization_IBSToken-Pausable-owner.svg)

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the IBSTokens are sent to the contract owner which is an externally-owned account (EOA) address on deployment. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

MediumPotential Bypass of Blacklisted Users in functionAcknowledged

The blacklist feature is designed to prevent the blacklisted users from transferring the `IBSToken` to others by validating the following **require** statement: ```solidity=145 function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool) { require(tokenBlacklist[msg.sender] == false); ``` The **require** statement prohibits the blacklisted users from calling `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` to move their funds by requiring the `msg.sender` not blacklisted. However, this feature can be bypassed by using a combination of the `approve()`/`increaseAllowance()` and `transferFrom()` functions. The blacklisted user could approve another account to transfer his tokens on his behalf.

LowNon-Standard ERC20 `decimal` DatatypeAcknowledged

The data type of the decimals state variable should be `uint8` to adhere to the EIP-20 standard. Currently, some smart contracts interacting with this ERC-20 token will result in a failure. Reference: [Specification of the `decimals()` Method](https://github.com/ethereum/ercs/blob/master/ERCS/erc-20.md#decimals)

LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FAcknowledged

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x82cb0ec6a31bc92e9483c08fdcbe2e6f3cc28100Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Part of IBS’s security record

IBS
Audits2 audits by 2 firmsLast audit May 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
Open IBS’s security record

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