Kontos

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Kontos on 12 Dec 2023: 28 findings, 0 critical; 9 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 17 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Kontos’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings28

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium702
Low1007
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `DeployFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and perform malicious upgrades. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8f9a-8c86e3d0-9cac-e137b3e6082b/diagrams/centralization_DeployFactory-DeployFactory-_owner.svg) In the contract `DeployFactory` the role `_superowner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8f9a-8c86e3d0-9cac-e137b3e6082b/diagrams/centralization_DeployFactory-DeployFactory-_superowner.svg) In the contract `SmartAccount` the role `_eoaOwner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_eoaOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and execute arbitrary transaction from the SmartAccount. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8f9a-8c86e3d0-9cac-e137b3e6082b/diagrams/centralization_SmartAccount-SmartAccount-_eoaOwner.svg) In the contract `SmartAccountBeacon` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and perform malicious upgrade to the beacon implementation contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8f9a-8c86e3d0-9cac-e137b3e6082b/diagrams/centralization_SmartAccountBeacon-SmartAccountBeacon-_owner.svg) In the `EntryPoint` contract, the `broker` role is responsible for bundling `userOps` and signing them to be executed via `handleOps()`. If addresses with `broker` role is compromised, normal user operations would not be able to be executed via the `EntryPoint` contract.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeAcknowledged

In the `DeployFactory` contract, the role `owner` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the SmartAccount Beacon and perform various upgrades to the `upgradeGateKeeperProxy` contract. Additionally, the `UpgradeGateKeeper` is an upgradeable contract that inherits other upgradeable contracts. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (7)

  • contracts/aa/contracts/EntryPoint.sol
  • contracts/aa/contracts/SmartAccountFactory.sol
  • contracts/aa/contracts/SmartAccount.sol
  • contracts/aa/contracts/UpgradeGateKeeper.sol
  • contracts/light/contracts/connector/erc20/FTConnector.sol
  • contracts/aa/contracts/DeployFactory.sol
  • contracts/aa/contracts/SmartAccountBeacon.sol

Part of Kontos’s security record

Kontos
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Kontos’s security record

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