Sabai Ecoverse Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Sabai Protocol (Sabai Ecoverse Audit) on 21 Jul 2023: 19 findings, 0 critical; 17 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Sabai Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings19

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High022
Medium003
Low0012
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

### SabaiStaking In the contract `SabaiStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * getReward() - Retrieve deposit rewards * getRestOfDeposits() - Transfer tokens in excess of deposits to the owner * stop() - Set the contract to expired and disable all deposits Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to control the status of the contract and transfer of funds. ### Ownable In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * renounceOwnership() - Give up contract ownership * transferOwnership() - Transfer ownership to another address Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to control the ownership of contracts. ### Sabai Token In the contract `Sabai Token` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * setAntisnipe() - Set antisniping address * setIsAntisnipe() - Set antisniping status Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to set antisniping properties. ### Sabai Vesting In the contract `Sabai Vesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * createVestingSchedule() - Create new vesting schedule for a certain beneficiary * createVestingScheduleMany() - Create vesting schedules for multiple beneficiaries * revoke() - Ends specific vesting schedule * withdraw() - Withdraw amounts in excess of total vesting deposits Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to control vesting schedules and withdraw tokens. --- The following content is based on the commit [93c47004157862c4d0b9967f83312aee278d4b36](https://github.com/Sabai-Ecoverse/contracts/tree/93c47004157862c4d0b9967f83312aee278d4b36). ### Sabai Staking In the contract `SabaiStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * ChangeSabaiRewarderAddress() - Change the reward distribution address * stop() - Set the contract to expired and disable all deposits ### Sabai Vesting The client added a new role `ManagerAddress` to manage the actual business. In the contract `Sabai Vesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * changeManagerAddress() - change the manager address In the contract `Sabai Vesting` the role `ManagerAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * createVestingSchedule() - Create new vesting schedule for a certain beneficiary * createVestingScheduleMany() - Create vesting schedules for multiple beneficiaries * revoke() - Ends specific vesting schedule * withdraw() - Withdraw amounts in excess of total vesting deposits

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All SABAI tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute SABAI tokens without the consensus of the community.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (10)

  • Sabai Token/Token/Ownable.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/AERC20Burnable.sol
  • Sabai Token/Staking/SabaiStaking.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/IERC20.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/AERC20.sol
  • Sabai Token/Vesting/contracts/Sabai Vesting.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/IERC20Metadata.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/Sabai Token.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/IAntisnipe.sol
  • Sabai Token/Token/Context.sol

Part of Sabai Protocol’s security record

Sabai Protocol
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jul 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Sabai Protocol’s security record

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CertiK

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