Metfi Audit 2

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed MetFi DAO (Metfi Audit 2) on 22 Mar 2023: 15 findings, 0 critical; 11 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen MetFi DAO’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings15

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High301
Medium000
Low1010
HighCentralization Related Risks in MetFiNFTMarket MoOpen

In the contract **MetFiNFTMarket**, the roles **_owner** and **FeeManager** have authorities over the functions: - `setPaymentCurrency()` to update the `paymentCurrencies` state for the input address `currency`; - `setTreasuryRoyaltiesPerCurrency()` to set the `treasuryRoyaltiesPerCurrency` value for the input address `currency`; - `setMarketRoyaltiesPerCurrency()` to set the `marketRoyaltiesPerCurrency` value for the input address `currency`; - `setFeeManger()` to update the `feeManager` state for the input address `manager`; - `setContractRegistry()` to set the input `registry` as the new `contractRegistry`; - `destroyContract()` to destroy the contract associated with the input `to`; - `collectFees()` to transfer all the balance of `MetFiNFTMarket` to the address associated with the input `destination`. Any compromise to the privileged accounts may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority, modify the sensitive state variables and transfer the tokens from the project to the malicious account.

HighCentralization Related Risks in PayoutControllerOpen

In the contract **MonthlyPayoutController**, the roles **_owner** and **receiver** have authorities over the following functions: - `destroy()` to destroy the account associated with `msg.sender`. - `doThePayout()` to make a payout for the receiver. --- In the contract **CommunityManagerPayoutController**, the role **RealmGuardian** has authority over the following functions: - `doThePayout()` to make a payout for the `RealmGuardian`. - `destroy()` to destroy the account associated with `msg.sender`. Any compromise to these privileged accounts may allow a hacker to take advantage of the authorities and cause unexpected consequences to the project.

HighCentralization Related Risks In UserConfig ModuleOpen

In the contract **UserConfig**, the role **RealmGuardian** has authority over the functions: - `addAllowedStringValueKey()` to add a new value associated with `key` to `allowedStringValueKeys`. - `addAllowedUintValueKey()` to add a new value associated with `key` to `allowedUnitValueKeys`. Any compromise to the `RealmGuardian` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and add allowed keys.

LowIncompatibility With Deflationary TokensOpen

When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. As a result, an inconsistency in the amount will occur, and the transaction may fail due to the validation checks. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) to the target contract, only 90 tokens actually arrive at the contract. There are several places in the implementation that may have issues with deflationary tokens. For example, in the function `checkAndTransferFunds()`, `msg.sender` transfers `royaltyAmount` to the contract account, and the contract then transfers `royaltyAmount` to the treasury. ```solidity=127 IERC20(listingData.currency).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), royaltyAmount + marketFee); if (royaltyAmount > 0) { transferRoyaltiesToTreasury(royaltyAmount, listingData.currency); } ``` If the token is a deflationary token, the contract will receive less than `royaltyAmount` but still need to send `royaltyAmount` to the treasury, so it is losing money.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (16)

  • contracts/Router.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IMetFiNFTMarket.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IRouter.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IPlatformView.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/KeeperCompatibleInterface.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IUserConfig.sol
  • contracts/MetFiNFTMarket.sol
  • contracts/management/CommunityManagerPayoutController.sol
  • contracts/management/ChainLinkKeeperStakingRebase.sol
  • contracts/management/MonthlyPayoutController.sol
  • contracts/PlatformView.sol
  • contracts/MetFiNFTMarketV2.sol
  • contracts/UserConfig.sol
  • contracts/NFTTransferProxy.sol
  • contracts/management/CommunityManagerPayoutControllerV2.sol
  • contracts/management/MonthlyPayoutControllerV2.sol

Part of MetFi DAO’s security record

MetFi DAO
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 4 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open MetFi DAO’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us