CertiK reviewed Hugo Inu (Hugo Inu - Audit) on 16 Jun 2023: 14 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 11 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 11 | 0 | 0 |
All `HUGO` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `HUGO` tokens without the consensus of the community.
Variable `_rOwned[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders. The Rate was higher at the moment of the `excludeFromReward(account)` call, so the `_rOwned[account] / _tOwned[account]` ratio is bigger than expected for accounts included in the reward. As of 06/08/2023, the ownership has been renounced in the transaction [0x54cdd0625d2d9f2bf12757b882daeabafbe996bab437d293bac86d36fe5459d1](https://bscscan.com/tx/0x54cdd0625d2d9f2bf12757b882daeabafbe996bab437d293bac86d36fe5459d1). The `includeInReward()` function is no longer executable, but the issue is still present in the code.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x28e3…210c0x28e3ff085f67163532a843fbf714178770a0210c | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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