POPG Token - Audit

CertiK2 addresses on Ethereum

CertiK reviewed POPG (POPG Token - Audit) on 10 Sep 2024: 12 findings, 0 critical; 3 acknowledged, 9 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen POPG’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium010
Low900
LowCheck-effect-interaction Pattern ViolationOpen

In the `release()` function, the variables `_erc20Released[token]` and `milestones` are updated after the `distributeRecipient()` and perform an external calls `IERC20(token).transfer`, which violates the check-effect-interaction pattern.

LowInconsistent token name definitionOpen

The token contract has inconsistent token name definitions in its constructor. The token name defined for the ERC20 contract is "POPG", while the token name defined for the EIP 712 domain separator (used in ERC20Permit) is "POPG Token": ```solidity=12 constructor(address _vestingWallet) ERC20("POPG", "POPG") ERC20Permit("POPG Token") ``` According to the [ERC20Permit](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/c1d6ad5a307945c7825cb3c4c911f2fd017c8725/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Permit.sol#L37) comment: "It's a good idea to use the same `name` that is defined as the ERC20 token name.". This implies that the token name used to initiate the `ERC20` potentially incorrect.

LowMissing Zero Address ValidationOpen

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=51 businessMarketing = _defaultBenificiary; ``` ```solidity=52 presale = _defaultBenificiary; ``` ```solidity=53 reserve = _defaultBenificiary; ``` ```solidity=54 advisor = _defaultBenificiary; ``` - `_defaultBenificiary` is not zero-checked before being used.

LowPotentially misconfiguration in the constructorOpen

There is a misconfiguration in the `inforDistributes` mapping, which associates distribution percentages with recipient indices that correspond to the `_recipients` array: ```solidity=56 _recipients = [businessMarketing, presale, reserve, advisor]; ``` The `inforDistributes` mapping is structured to hold an array of `InforDistribute` structs, keyed by the recipient index: `recipient_index => [{beneficiary, percentage, phase}, ...]`. ```solidity=40 mapping(uint8 => InforDistribute[]) internal inforDistributes; ``` - The `recipient_index` is the array index of the `_recipients` array. - The `beneficiary` address is the token recipient. A discrepancy has been found where entries intended for the `presale` account are mistakenly assigned to the `reserve` account, for example: ```solidity=71 inforDistributes[2].push(InforDistribute(presale, 55, 2)); ``` Here, the `recipient_index` is set to `2`, which, according to the `_recipients` array, corresponds to the `reserve`, not the `presale`. However, the `beneficiary` is set to the `presale` address. Although all recipients are defaulted to the same address in the constructor, the inconsistency in the code logic would lead to confusion.

LowRedundant InheritancesOpen

The `POPGToken` contract inherits from `ERC20`, `ERC20Permit` and `Ownable`, but the ownership functionality appears unused. This redundancy can cause confusion and might be optimized for efficiency: ```solidity=9 contract POPGToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit, Ownable { ```

LowRedundant to recalculate the `currentPhase`Open

In the `release()` function, the `currentPhase` is calculated and cached in L263: ```solidity=263 uint256 currentPhase = getPhaseAtTime(block.timestamp); ``` However, it is recalculated again in the function: ```solidity=276 milestones[getPhaseAtTime(block.timestamp)].released = true; ``` Recalculating the `currentPhase` is redundant since it has already been determined and stored earlier in the function.

LowThe `benificiary` of `InforDistribute` is not updOpen

The `changeAddressBeneficiary()` function intends to update the beneficiary address within the `InforDistribute` struct for a given recipient index. However, the function only updates the beneficiary address of the first entry in the `InforDistribute` array associated with the provided index: ```solidity=146 inforDistributes[_index][0].benificiary = _benificiary; ``` When this function is called with an index and a new beneficiary address, it does not iterate through the entire array of `InforDistribute` structs at that index. As a result, only the first entry is updated, which can lead to inconsistencies where subsequent entries retain the old beneficiary address. For example, calling `changeAddressBeneficiary(3, newAdvisor)` only updates the beneficiary for the first entry at index 3, while other entries such as `inforDistributes[3][1]` and `inforDistributes[3][2]` remain unchanged.

LowThe `InforDistribute` saves inaccurate phasesOpen

The index of `milestones` array should match with the phrase number based on the logic in the `getTotalDistributedAmount()`, `release()` and `unlockRestAmount()` functions. The contract contains a mismatch between the index of the `milestones` array and the associated phrase number. The `milestones` array uses zero-based indexing, where the first milestone is at index 0: ```solidity milestones[0] = Milestone(MILESTONE_1_DATE, 20, false); ``` However, the first phrase number in the `InforDistribute` struct is initialized with a value of 1, as shown below: ```solidity inforDistributes[0].push(InforDistribute(businessMarketing, 35, 1)); ``` This discrepancy could lead to inconsistencies and confusion.

LowUnused `SafeERC20` LibraryOpen

The `VestingWallet` contract imports and declares usage of the `SafeERC20` library for the `IERC20` interface: ```solidity=11 using SafeERC20 for IERC20; ``` However, throughout the contract, the `SafeERC20` library functions are not utilized when transferring tokens. This can lead to missed safety checks during token transfers, such as checking for a successful transfer, which `SafeERC20` provides.

Contracts in scope2

AddressChainSource code
0x59caf3854a29d886080fe28dfecb2dec61cf5ba2Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source
0xdac070102b0cfde1493026454c9c608924f6db71Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Part of POPG’s security record

POPG
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open POPG’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us