Apeiron - Sanctuary Contract

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Apeiron (Apeiron - Sanctuary Contract) on 4 Nov 2022: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Apeiron’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High040
Medium000
Low001
HighCentralization Risks in ApeironPlanet.solAcknowledged

In the contract `ApeironPlanet` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn all NFTs by calling the function `burn()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_ApeironPlanet-ApeironPlanet-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in ApeironPlanetPresaleFactoAcknowledged

In the contract `ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all funds by calling the function withdrawFunds(). ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory-ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in BreedPlanet.solAcknowledged

In the contract `BreedPlanet` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the prices of token Aprs and token Anima to zero. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/d7ab32c1d8ff47a38461659ae7b70fae/diagrams/centralization_BreedPlanet-BreedPlanet-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeAcknowledged

Since these contracts are upgradeable, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, he/she can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (19)

  • contracts/utils/ChainlinkRng.sol
  • contracts/utils/AccessProtectedUpgradable.sol
  • contracts/PlanetMeta.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IApeironPlanet.sol
  • contracts/BreedPlanetData.sol
  • contracts/BreedPlanetBase.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IBreedPlanetData.sol
  • contracts/utils/OracleInterface.sol
  • contracts/ApeironPlanetGenerator.sol
  • contracts/utils/Random.sol
  • contracts/utils/Oracle.sol
  • contracts/utils/MultiWhitelist.sol
  • contracts/BornPlanet.sol
  • contracts/BreedPlanet.sol
  • contracts/utils/RNG.sol
  • contracts/ApeironPlanetPresaleFactory.sol
  • contracts/utils/AccessProtected.sol
  • contracts/ApeironPlanet.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IPlanetMeta.sol

Part of Apeiron’s security record

Apeiron
Audits3 audits by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open Apeiron’s security record

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CertiK

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