CertiK reviewed CFC Project (CFC-Audit) on 30 Aug 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 3 acknowledged, 2 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 0 |
In the contract `CFCToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract.  In the contract `MRC20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove the frozen addresses and transfer tokens to any address and add a time lock to lock the tokens  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer ownership to any address. 
All of the `CFC` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xf3f4…990d0xf3f4e51bf642625c922aad9fe7dc6c22a199990d | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
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