ApxUSD Stablecoin

QuantstampCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Quantstamp reviewed ApxUSD (ApxUSD Stablecoin) on 13 Feb 2026: 9 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed; 1 more marked mitigated.

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Findings14

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0010
Medium0020
Low0061

Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalRate Limit Is Enforced at Request Time, Not Mint ExecutionAcknowledged

`MinterV0` records rate-limit usage in `requestMint()` but `executeMint()` does not re-check or update the rate limit. A minter can queue requests over time and then execute them in a short window, bypassing the intended issuance cap for the rate-limit period.

Informational`AddressList` `add()` and `remove()` Emit Events Without Checking Return ValueFixed

`AddressList.add()` and `AddressList.remove()` call `EnumerableSet.add()` and `EnumerableSet.remove()`, which return `true` when the set was modified and `false` when it was not (e.g. `add` when the address is already in the list, `remove` when it is not). ``` function add(address user) external override restricted { if (user == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress("user"); _addresses.add(user); // audit note: This call returns a boolean emit Added(user); } ``` The contract does not check these return values and always emits `Added(user)` or `Removed(user)`. Off-chain indexers or UIs that rely on these events may incorrectly assume a state change occurred when none did.:

Informational`ApyUSD` Withdrawal Fee Is Silently Retained in Vault when `feeWallet` Is Not ConfiguredFixed

In `ApyUSD._withdraw()`, the fee is always deducted from the user's shares (burning shares for `assets + fee`). However, the fee transfer to `feeWallet` is conditional on `fee > 0 && feeRecipient != address(0) && feeRecipient != address(this)`. If `unlockingFee > 0` but `feeWallet` has not been set (defaults to `address(0)`), the fee is still charged from the user but remains in the vault, effectively donating it to remaining ApyUSD holders. This is not transparent and could silently penalize early withdrawers if the admin sets a fee before configuring the fee wallet.

InformationalImprove ValidationsFixed

1. The `ApxUSD.setDenyList()` and `ApyUSD.setDenyList()` functions do not validate `newDenyList`, while `CommitToken.setDenyList()` has this validation. Consider validating against `address(0)` and unifying the function implementations. 2. `CommitToken.setUnlockingDelay()` allows zero: The constructor requires `unlockingDelay_ > 0`, but `setUnlockingDelay()` accepts any `uint48` including `0`. Setting the delay to zero makes all redeem requests instantly claimable, bypassing the cooldown. While this requires the `ADMIN_ROLE`, it contradicts the constructor invariant. Add validation in `setUnlockingDelay()`: if `(newUnlockingDelay == 0)` revert `InvalidAmount("unlockingDelay", newUnlockingDelay)`. 3. The `CommitToken.requestRedeem()` and `CommitToken.requestWithdraw()` functions allow `0`-value requests. Consider validating the assets and shares parameters against `0`.

Contracts in scope

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Part of ApxUSD’s security record

ApxUSD
Audits4 audits by 3 firmsLast audit Apr 2026, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 4 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
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Quantstamp

240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026

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