Wemix Retainer 44 DEX Bridge

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 44 DEX Bridge) on 20 Jul 2023: 9 findings, 0 critical; 7 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen WEMIX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium002
Low004
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `AwayMintBurnableERC20` the role "minter" has authority over the following functions: - mint - burn Any compromise to the "minter" accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint/burn tokens. ----- In the contract `BridgeV1` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the bridge, and upgrade the implementation contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1-BridgeV1-_owner.svg) In the contract `BridgeV1` the role "validator" has authority over the following function: - enter Any compromise to the "validator" accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and submit malicious enter messages. In the contract `BridgeV1` the role "validator" has authority to provide signatures for users to bridge tokens in via the following function: - enter Any compromise to the "validator" accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and provide malicious signatures. ----- In the contract `BridgeV1Away` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add malicious tokens at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1Away-BridgeV1Away-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `BridgeV1AwayFactory` the role "bridge" has authority over the following function: - addMinter Any compromise to the "bridge" accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add malicious token minters. In the contract `BridgeV1AwayFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change token minter to a malicious one, upgrade implementation contract to a malicious one, create a malicious bridge, and change bridge implementation to a malicious one. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1AwayFactory-BridgeV1AwayFactory-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter` the role `__factory` has authority over the following function: - addMinterByFactory Any compromise to the `__factory` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add privileged token minters at will. In the contract `BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove privileged token minters at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter-BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter-_owner.svg) In the contract `BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter` the role "minter" has authority over the following functions: - mint - burn Any compromise to the "minter" accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint/burn tokens. ----- In the contract `BridgeV1FeeTable` the role `__bridge` has authority over the following function: - addToken Any compromise to the `__bridge` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add token fee information at will. In the contract `BridgeV1FeeTable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update/remove token fee information at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1FeeTable-BridgeV1FeeTable-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `BridgeV1Home` the role `_owner` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add malicious tokens at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1Home-BridgeV1Home-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `BridgeV1TokenManager` the role `_owner` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `__feeTable` at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/ce77593a3c5a40dc87549f6a383b28b3/diagrams/centralization_BridgeV1TokenManager-BridgeV1TokenManager-_owner.svg) In the contract `BridgeV1TokenManager` the role "validator" has authority over the following functions: - pauseToken - unpauseToken Any compromise to the

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the contracts `BridgeV1Validator`, `BridgeV1AwayFactory`, `BridgeV1TokenManager`, `BridgeV1`, `BridgeV1Away`, and `BridgeV1Home`, the role `_owner` has the authority to update the implementation contracts. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (10)

  • contracts/BridgeV1TokenManager.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1AwayTokenMinter.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1Away.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1AwayFactory.sol
  • contracts/AwayMintBurnableERC20.sol
  • contracts/WrappedETH.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1Validator.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1Home.sol
  • contracts/BridgeV1FeeTable.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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