Wemix Retainer 49 - BYLOManager, VaultManager

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 49 - BYLOManager, VaultManager) on 7 Aug 2023: 6 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low104
HighCentralization RisksOpen

In the contract `BYLOManager` the role `_setter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_setter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change critical parameters of the project. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_BYLOManager-BYLOManager-_setter.svg) In the contract `VaultManagerDeployer` the role `_deployerrole` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_deployerrole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and deploy potentially defective or malicious vault manager contracts. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_VaultManagerDeployer-VaultManagerDeployer-_deployerrole.svg) In the contract `ScheduleStorage` the role `_setter` and `_vaultmanager` have authority over the functions shown in the diagrams below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_ScheduleStorage-ScheduleStorage-_setter.svg) ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_ScheduleStorage-ScheduleStorage-_vaultmanager.svg) Any compromise to the `_setter` or `_vaultmanager` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change critical storage variables. In the contract `VaultManager` the role `_setter` and `navigator` have authority over the functions shown in the diagrams below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_VaultManager-VaultManager-_setter.svg) ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a36f775648d2484eaef2c7e06d173f3e/diagrams/centralization_VaultManager-VaultManager-navigator.svg) Any compromise to the `_setter` or `navigator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change vault address and other critical parameters of the project.

LowThird-Party DependenciesOpen

The audited code base interacts with several contracts outside of the scope of this particular audit, as well as database off-chain related to game items, and relies on the `validator` signature for important verifications. Access control of some of these external parties are also critical for the security for the system overall. For example, in the `VaultManager` contract, we assume that the `Navigator` provides correct inputs to the `exchangeToToken()` and `exchangeToItem()` functions, and that the `sender` correctly corresponds to the user intending to perform the transaction. Otherwise, user funds could be misappropriated without the user's consent. The scope of the audit treats these entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, these external parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (5)

  • Bylo/contracts/BYLOManager.sol
  • GameToken/contracts/VaultManager/ExchangePoliciesStorage/ScheduleStorage.sol
  • ContractDeployer/contracts/VaultManagerDeployer/VaultManagerDeployer.sol
  • GameToken/contracts/VaultManager/VaultManager.sol
  • GameToken/contracts/VaultManager/ExchangeManager/ExchangeManager.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
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CertiK

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