Quantstamp reviewed LI.FI on 5 May 2022: 10 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 1 open.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 4 | 4 |
If during an upgrade `diamondCut(...)` calls are executed in multiple Ethereum transactions, users may be exposed to contracts that are upgraded only partially (i.e., some of the functions are upgraded while others are not). This may result in unexpected inconsistencies.
For all the bridging facets the input parameters of its functions that are open to arbitrary end users are all generated by offchain components which can be hacked or DDoSed and the data passed in are never checked.
`constructor` in `src/LiFiDiamond.sol` does not check if `address _contractOwner` and `address _diamondCutFacet` are non-zero addresses.
There are some actions that could have important consequences for end-users. 1. The programs deployed are upgradable and can be changed by the admin team at any time at will. 1. Based on `L22` of `src/Facets/WithdrawFacet.sol`, the admin team of the platform can transfer whatever ether/ERC20 assets that are held by the platform to any address for rescue purposes. 1. Based on `src/Facets/DexManagerFacet.sol`, the platform owner can approve any dex and any function signature.
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Repository and files the report names (31)
236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026
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