CertiK reviewed Ecoin Finance on 11 Nov 2022: 10 findings, 1 critical; 6 marked fixed, 4 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 5 |
In the contract `EcoinToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and implement a few attacks. We list the attacks below: 1. A compromised owner may first wipe the contract's ether balance by calling the function `safeWithdraw()`. 2. A hacker may pause the swapping mechanism and stake by calling the functions `setPausedSwapPool()` and `setPausedStake()`. 3. Set the minimum amount to swap to an inordinate amount. 
All of the [Ecoin] tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute [Ecoin] tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.
Functions that affect the status of sensitive variables should emit events as notifications for the community.
The linked statements are reinitialized to the same value when `initialize()` is called. Therefore the linked statements in the `initialized()` function do not affect the functionality of the codebase.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x1617…c6cb0x1617851311055b8c984b9949d1d3309275fcc6cb | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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