Quantstamp reviewed Serum on 7 Aug 2020: 4 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 4 | 0 | 0 |
As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the [allowance double-spend exploit](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/b4f87bb8fc25fb07f73099701e39e167a3d36465/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#L71-L78), as with other ERC20 tokens.
All contracts inheriting from `BurnerRole` (directly or indirectly) may be permanently left without a burner; consequently, any operation dependent on the `onlyBurner` modifier will fail. Similar notes apply to miner and pauser roles.
Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. The contracts also employ pauser, minter, and burner roles. Although these roles are useful, they are trusted with a reasonable use of their privileges.
Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.4.*`. The caret (`^`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version _and above_, hence the term "unlocked".
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Repository and files the report names (1)
236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026
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