Wemix Retainer 131 NightCrowTWAPV3

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 131 NightCrowTWAPV3) on 22 Aug 2024: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low202
HighCentralization Risks in GameTokenTwapRouterV2.solOpen

In the contract `GameTokenTwapRouterV2` the role `_editor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_editor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and register/remove game token, token minter and change lock price and freeze period of the minter. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-5e46-78a9a480-ba5a-4bf2baea2916/diagrams/centralization_GameTokenTwapRouterV2-GameTokenTwapRouterV2-_editor.svg)

LowLack of Equality Check in `changeGameTokenMinterOpen

The `changeGameTokenMinter()` function does not check whether the `newGameTokenMinter` is the same as the `oldMinter`. If these addresses are the same, the function will mistakenly delete the lock price and freeze period information associated with the `newGameTokenMinter` at the end of the function, leading to unintended consequences. ```solidity=93 function changeGameTokenMinter(address newGameTokenMinter, address gameToken, string memory symbol) external onlyEditor { require(newGameTokenMinter != address(0) && gameToken != address(0), "GTTR : address is zero"); require(tokenToTwap[gameToken] != address(0), "GTTR : not registered game token"); require(tokenToTwap[gameToken] == symbolToTwap[symbol] , "GTTR : wrong input"); address oldMinter = tokenToTwap[gameToken]; //relation info symbolToTwap[symbol] = newGameTokenMinter; tokenToTwap[gameToken] = newGameTokenMinter; //lock price info lockPrice[newGameTokenMinter] = lockPrice[oldMinter]; freezePeriod[newGameTokenMinter] = freezePeriod[oldMinter]; delete lockPrice[oldMinter]; delete freezePeriod[oldMinter]; emit GameTokenChanged(gameToken, oldMinter, newGameTokenMinter); } ```

LowOut Of Scope DependenciesOpen

The protocol serves as the underlying entity to interact with out-of-scope dependencies. The out-of-scope dependencies that the contracts interact with are: - `IGameTokenTwapRouter.sol`; - `IGameTokenMinter.sol` - `EditorRole.sol`; The scope of the audit treats out-of-scope dependencies as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • contracts/GameTokenTwapRouterV2.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
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CertiK

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