YFX-V3

In the contract **FundingLogic**, the role **controller** has authority over the following functions: - function updateMaxFundingRate() - function updateMarketPriceFeed() Any compromise to the **controller** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following(but not limited to). - Update max funding rate to any value and disrupt the funding rate calculation mechanism. - Update market price feed to a malicious contract and disrupt the funding rate calculation mechanism. --- In the contract **InterestLogic**, the role **controller** has authority over the following functions: - function updateRatePerHour() Any compromise to the **controller** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following(but not limited to). - Update max hourly interest rate of any pool, and disrupt the borrow rate calculation mechanism. --- In the contract **InviteManager**, the role **controller** has authority over the following functions: - function setIsUTPPaused() - function setIsURPPaused() - function setTradeToken() - function setInviteToken() - function setTier() - function setReferrerTier() - function setCodeOwnerBySystem() Any compromise to the **controller** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following(but not limited to). - Pause/Unpause the `UTP` mode, which controls whether or not to send `User Trading Proof Token` to traders. - Pause/Unpause the `URP` mode, which controls whether or not to send `User Referral Proof Token` to inviters. - Update the `User Trading Proof Token` to any new token. - Update the `User Referral Proof Token` to any new token. - Update the fee rebate and fee discount of an invitation level. - Update the invitation level of any inviter. A higher invitation level means a higher fee rebate for the inviter and a higher fee discount for the invitee. - Update the invitation code of an user. In the contract **InviteManager**, the role **router** has authority over the following functions: - function setTraderReferralCode() Under normal circumstances, the **router** should be the `Router` contract and this would not be a centralization issue. However, if the router is set up maliciously in `Manager` contract, this could lead to hackers being able to tamper with other trader's invitation relationships at will and profit from them. In the contract **InviteManager**, the role **market** has authority over the following functions: - function updateTradeValue() Under normal circumstances, the **market** should be the `Market` contract and this would not be a centralization issue. However, if the market is set up maliciously in `Manager` contract, this could lead to hackers being able to mint `TradeToken` and `InviteToken` at will and profit from them. --- In the contract **Manager**, the role **controller** has authority over the following functions: - function pause() - function unpause() - function modifyLiquidator() - function modifyTreasurer() - function modifyOrderNumLimit() - function modifyRouter() - function addSigner() - function removeSigner() - function modifyController() - function modifyRiskFunding() - function modifyInterestStatus() - function modifyFundingStatus() - function modifyVault() - function modifyExecuteOrderFee() - function modifyInviteManager() - function modifyCancelElapse() - function modifyCommunityExecuteOrderDelay() - function modifyTriggerOrderDuration() - function createPair() - function setMarketConfig() - function modifyMarketCreateOrderPaused() - function modifyMarketTPSLPricePaused() - function modifyMarketCreateTriggerOrderPaused() - function modifyMarketUpdateMarginPaused() Any compromise to the **controller** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following(but not limited to). - Pause/Unpause the `YFX` protocol. - Update the liquidators who are entitled to liquidate. - Update the treasurers who are entitled to use the risk funds at will. If set up as a treasurer, the hacker can drain the risk funds. - Update the maximum number of orders. - Update the `Router` contract, which is a portal of all the user operations. - Add/Remove the signers who are entitled to provide the off-chain price and execute orders. If set up as a signer, the hacker can manipulate the price and get profits. - Update the controller who is the super admin of the `YFX` protocol. If set up as the controller, the hacker can do any thing mentioned in this section. - Update the `RiskFunding` contract, which is used to hold the risk funds. If set up as the risk funding contract, the hacker can receive the risk funds when liquidation happens. - Activate/Deactivate the interests module. - Activate/Deactivate the funding module. - Update the `Vault` contract, which is used to hold the market/pool assets. If set up as the vault contract, the hacker can steal the entire assets and ruin the `YFX` protocol. - Update the execute order fee, which is the gas f

In the contract **TradeToken**, the role **inviteManager** has authority over the following function: - function mint() Under normal circumstances, the **inviteManager** should be the `InviteManager` contract and this would not be a centralization issue. However, if the `inviteManager` is set up maliciously in `Manager` contract, this could lead to hackers being able to mint `TradeToken` at will and profit from it.

The valuation of assets in the `YFX` market depends on two sources: firstly, the price of `ChainLink`, and secondly, the off-chain price. According to the logical framework of the `FastPriceFeed` and `MarketPriceFeed` contracts, it is understood that the final valuation of market assets is determined by selecting the maximum or minimum value between the `ChainLink` price and the off-chain price, based on the given scenario. The `ChainLink` price is obtained by accessing the `ChainLink` Price Feed contract, while the off-chain price is submitted as a function parameter value during the execution of orders by the `PriceProvider` role and during the liquidation process by the `Liquidator` role in the `FastPriceFeed` contract. In this situation, any compromise to the `Controller & PriceProvider`/ `Controller & Liquidator` accounts may provide an opportunity for a hacker to exploit this authority and engage in the following activities: - Invoking the `batchExecuteOrder()` function to execute opening/closing orders and submit forged market asset prices, thereby influencing the actual trade prices. - Invoking the `setPrices()` function will affect the trade prices. - Invoking the `liquidate()` function to initiate the liquidation process and submitting forged market asset prices, thereby affecting the liquidation price.

The `Vault` contracts stores all the deposits including liquidity pool assets and user position margins. Any compromise to the **controller** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and simply take all the deposits.