CertiK reviewed DEFI World (Defi World - Audit) on 12 Jan 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 open.
The original report was removed from its address (seen 17 Oct 2026).
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 0 |
All of the **DWC** tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
According to the design of `Defi World`, the owner address can only be read. Since no methods can be restricted to only the owner role, there is no need for an explicit owner role.
The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x96f0…4b0f0x96f0a7167ab7ba6e59ffb68707c9d1b049524b0f | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
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