CertiK reviewed Fabwelt on 12 May 2023: 8 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 7 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 0 |
In the contracts `Ownable` and `FabweltToken`, the role `_owner` has the authority over the following functions: - `Ownable.renounceOwnership()`, which renounces the owner role and disables all functions with the `onlyOwner` modifier; - `Ownable.transferOwnership()`, which transfers the owner role to another address; - `FabweltToken.excludeAccount()`, which excludes an address's tokens for rate calculations; - `FabweltToken.includeAccount()`, which includes an excluded address's tokens for rate calculations; - `FabweltToken.setAsCharityAccount()`, which sets the address for `FeeAddress`; - `FabweltToken.updateFee()`, which decides the fees for transfers. For the contract deployed at [0x23e8b6a3f6891254988b84da3738d2bfe5e703b9 on Polygon](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x23e8b6a3f6891254988b84da3738d2bfe5e703b9), the `_owner` is [0x63401aac2469bfe676d134571defe64839c35a61](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x63401aac2469bfe676d134571defe64839c35a61), which is an EOA (externally owned account). Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and disrupt how the token should operate.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x23e8…03b90x23e8b6a3f6891254988b84da3738d2bfe5e703b9 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
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