CertiK reviewed Flash Technologies (Flash) on 11 Nov 2024: 2 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 0 |
According to the on-chain data, the following authority involved with Flash token: - Freeze authority has been assigned to the [CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS](https://explorer.solana.com/address/CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS). - The metadata update authority for the Flash Token is centralized to a single account [CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS](https://explorer.solana.com/address/CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS). Any compromise of the aforementioned accounts or authorities could allow an attacker to freeze any number of tokens during circulation, thereby disrupting normal market trading. Additionally, if the metadata update authority is compromised, attackers could maliciously manipulate the contract metadata, which could mislead users and platforms, disrupting ecosystem operations based on incorrect token information.
All of the Flash tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project. Based on the on-chain analysis, the initially minted 100,000,000.000000 (6 decimals) Flash token has been transferred to the token account [6E8FKs2TsDdoSP5QZHj6FPtGutCV7taJWe9314PF7dwf](https://explorer.solana.com/address/6E8FKs2TsDdoSP5QZHj6FPtGutCV7taJWe9314PF7dwf)(owner: [CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS](https://explorer.solana.com/address/CKy7UniWsn7sDzMngTknmJczpv1PoB3zspZDnBidMjoS)) in the transaction [4My4QyEhDcgYs3t6EFbmpgC6dHWrTop5yakE5cJhCETqdMD82Lcf3gFp7rsvSp98VfG2cwDbuZsvpxR9oYPX1SYP](https://explorer.solana.com/tx/4My4QyEhDcgYs3t6EFbmpgC6dHWrTop5yakE5cJhCETqdMD82Lcf3gFp7rsvSp98VfG2cwDbuZsvpxR9oYPX1SYP). As of 11/11, the detailed holder list can be found on the [solscan](https://solscan.io/token/3p495oCmC4jsBrdLLny7Qm77mM62rUnQAgaBT6qNVTvg#holders).
| Address | Chain |
|---|---|
| 3p495o…VTvg3p495oCmC4jsBrdLLny7Qm77mM62rUnQAgaBT6qNVTvg | Chain: Solana |
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