CertiK reviewed MetaCity M (MetaCityM 2 - Audit) on 2 Aug 2022: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 2 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 1 |
In the contract `Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change airdrop settings and whitelisted addresses.  In the contract `Airdrop` the role `airdropWhitelist` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `airdropWhitelist` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and distribute airdrop NFT without the consensus of the community.  In the contract `Counter` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the tokenID count to an arbitrary value.  In the contract `Purchase` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, e.g. minting NFT tokens without cost and setting arbitrary mint fees. 
`public` functions that are never called by the contract could be declared as `external`. `external` functions are more efficient than `public` functions.
The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.
Repository and files the report names (2)
1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025
See CertiK’s auditsSomething wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us