MetaCityM 2 - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed MetaCity M (MetaCityM 2 - Audit) on 2 Aug 2022: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen MetaCity M’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium010
Low101
HighCentralization RisksOpen

In the contract `Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change airdrop settings and whitelisted addresses. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/74789380f6504498b669f78181265b26/diagrams/centralization_mcmasset2-Airdrop-_owner.svg) In the contract `Airdrop` the role `airdropWhitelist` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `airdropWhitelist` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and distribute airdrop NFT without the consensus of the community. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/74789380f6504498b669f78181265b26/diagrams/centralization_mcmasset2-Airdrop-airdropWhitelist.svg) In the contract `Counter` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the tokenID count to an arbitrary value. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/74789380f6504498b669f78181265b26/diagrams/centralization_mcmasset2-Counter-_owner.svg) In the contract `Purchase` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, e.g. minting NFT tokens without cost and setting arbitrary mint fees. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/74789380f6504498b669f78181265b26/diagrams/centralization_mcmasset2-Purchase-_owner.svg)

LowImproper Usage of `public` and `external` TypeOpen

`public` functions that are never called by the contract could be declared as `external`. `external` functions are more efficient than `public` functions.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • mcmasset2.sol
  • mcmland2.sol

Part of MetaCity M’s security record

MetaCity M
Audits2 audits by 1 firmLast audit Aug 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findings1 critical acknowledged, not fixedReported in “MetaCityMLand2” by CertiK, May 2022. The team acknowledged it.
Open MetaCity M’s security record

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CertiK

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