Gomdori

CertiK30 Aug 2023Files named in the report

Audit

CertiK reviewed GOMDori on 30 Aug 2023: 12 findings, 0 critical; 3 acknowledged, 9 open.

No open critical findings

Open the report Open GOMDori’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Open	Acknowledged
Critical	0	0
High	0	2
Medium	0	1
Low	9	0

HighCentralization Risks in GOMD.solAcknowledged

In the contract `GOMDORI` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn tokens modifying the totalSupply, therefore the price, of the token and freeze/unfreeze accounts at will. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6731200760ac4ee8a9dc7cbfd5c8dd8d/diagrams/centralization_GOMD-GOMDORI-_owner.svg)

HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the `GOMD` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

MediumFrozen Addresses Can Receive TokensAcknowledged

In contract `GOMD`, the functions `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` check if the source address from which the tokens are sent is frozen or not. Although, there is no check that ensures that assets are not transferred to a frozen address or that the `msg.sender` of `transferFrom()` is not a frozen address. In this way, a frozen address could receive assets that are then not transferrable anymore since it is frozen.