Router Chain 2 audit

Oak SecurityCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Oak Security reviewed Router Protocol (Router Chain 2 audit) on 30 Apr 2024: 27 findings, 7 critical; 26 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged.

7 critical findings, fixed
Open the reportOpen Router Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on GitHub.

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Findings27

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical007
High0011
Medium000
Low018
CriticalAnyone can submit forged cross-chain ack requestsFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalAnyone can submit forged cross-chain requestsFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalBlocked cross-chain requests are indefinitely retried and could be exploited for denial-of-service attacksFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalDeactivated price feeders are not enforcedFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalNon-deterministic iteration in ClaimEventSlashing can cause consensus failureFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalUnapproved fee payers can block legitimate requests which can be exploited for denial-of-service attacksFixed

The report gives no description here.

CriticalUnbonding validators can circumvent slashingFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighAnyone can create a new relayer configuration with a potentially invalid IBC channel, resulting in failed cross-chain requests via IBCFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighCustom application panics in EndBlocker can halt the chainFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighExecuting crosstalk requests with a missing IBC relayer config results in indefinite retries and liveness issuesFixed

The report gives no description here.

Show 10 more
HighFailed cross-chain ack requests are incorrectly stored as successfulFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighFailed requests will not be reflected for ErrorGasOverflow panicsFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighGetLastUnBondingBlockHeight will always return zeroFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighIncomplete genesis handling causes loss of storage valuesFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighSlashing risk due to sequential attestation processingFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighSymbol prices requested by the BandChain oracle are not namespaced by the price feeder name, resulting in the inability to retrieve pricesFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighUnhandled errors in the codebaseFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighZero values initialization affects gas handling and fee refundsFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowAmino codec must be registered to support end users with hardware devices like LedgerFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowErrors are not propagated correctlyFixed

The report gives no description here.

Show 6 more
Lowgas-prices and token-prices CLI commands are ineffective due to not specifying the PriceFeederName and corresponding pricesFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowHandleAckDefaultValidation does not update the event block height, causing incorrect query responses to be returnedFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowPrice feeders can feed prices with older resolve timesFixed

The report gives no description here.

Lowrwasm module does not support InstantiateContract2, UpdateAdmin, and ClearAdminFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowThe execute-cw-contract CLI command does not supply Msg and Funds to the MsgExecuteContract messageFixed

The report gives no description here.

LowValidators joining the network after attestations were submitted are subject to slashing and have to attest to previous claimsFixed

The report gives no description here.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Part of Router Protocol’s security record

Router Protocol
Audits2 audits by 1 firmLast audit May 2024, by Oak Security.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 2 reports, 8 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Router Protocol’s security record

Security firm

Oak Security

33 projects reviewed · 60 reports · latest May 2026

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