Quantstamp reviewed Idle Finance (Idle Governance) on 20 Oct 2020: 3 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firm. Not counted as findings.
(a) For `contracts\PriceOracle.sol`, a potentially malicious owner (if the private key was leaked) can change the feed contract addresses/block length to give incorrect price oracles that can affect the token. While privileged roles for the Idle token are addressed in https://developers.idle.finance/advanced/admin-powers, it is not addressed for the price oracle. (b) For `contracts/IdleController.sol`, the admin can manipulate the rate of tokens in which each market receives by adding/removing idle markets to the list. **update-2020-10-26**: Idle Team stated that the owner of the `PriceOracle.sol` and the `IdleController.sol` contracts will be the Timelock contract (i.e., the governance itself) directly on deploy.
For `contracts\Idle.sol`, `delegateBySig()` should validate the `v` and `s` parameters as in `ECDSA.sol` (See: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/2bb06b1af4d57cf47c700992b327a08bebf64879/contracts/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#L46).
Integer overflow/underflow occur when an integer hits its bit-size limit. Every integer has a set range; when that range is passed, the value loops back around. A clock is a good analogy: at 11:59, the minute hand goes to 0, not 60, because 59 is the largest possible minute. Integer overflow and underflow may cause many unexpected kinds of behavior and was the core reason for the `batchOverflow` attack. Here's an example with `uint8` variables, meaning unsigned integers with a range of `0..255`. ``` function under_over_flow() public { uint8 num_players = 0; num_players = num_players - 1; // 0 - 1 now equals 255! if (num_players == 255) { emit LogUnderflow(); // underflow occurred } uint8 jackpot = 255; jackpot = jackpot + 1; // 255 + 1 now equals 0! if (jackpot == 0) { emit LogOverflow(); // overflow occurred } } ``` In particular, for `contracts\PriceOracle.sol`, there is a potential underflow on `L70`: `... 10**(18-tokenDecimals) ...`. It is recommended to use `SafeMath` for this operation.
For `contracts\IdleController.sol`, the values inside the `priceOracle_` input parameter is not checked to be different from `0x0` inside the `_setPriceOracle` function.
For `contracts/PriceOracle.sol`, in function `getCompApr`, the computed pair will always return a result that has the last two digits as `0`, in `L58` due to division before multiplication `div(cTokenNAV).mul(100)`.
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