RToken Ethereum Contracts

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed Reserve (RToken Ethereum Contracts) on 31 Oct 2019: 9 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Reserve’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium001
Low403
LowAllowance Double-Spend ExploitOpen

As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the [allowance double-spend exploit](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/b4f87bb8fc25fb07f73099701e39e167a3d36465/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#L71-L78), as with other ERC20 tokens.

LowSource Account can be RecipientOpen

While the code prevents from the obvious inheritance case where the recipient is the original owner (`SELF_HAT_ID`) on `L478`, it seems that the `src` can hand craft a hat that makes him-/her-self a recipient. This way it would be automatically inherited by the recipient.

LowUnlocked PragmaOpen

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.5.*`. The caret (`^`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version _and above_, hence the term "unlocked." For consistency and to prevent unexpected behavior in the future, it is recommended to remove the caret to lock the file onto a specific Solidity version. Because the use of `ABIEncoderV2`, the `pragma` should be locked above `0.5.10`, as there is a known bug in array storage: [https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/06/25/solidity-storage-array-bugs/](https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/06/25/solidity-storage-array-bugs/) There are currently no signed integer arrays that are initialized in a vulnerable way, hence the low severity of this issue. However, it is best to take precautions for future updates of the code.

LowUser can Lock Oneself OutOpen

In the functions `distributeLoans` and `recollectLoans` a user may accidentally lock oneself out if the number of `recipients` or the number of `proportions` is too high. Consequently, the for loops on lines 612, 619, 697 and 793 will require too much gas to finish and the transaction (function call) will fail for those accounts.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (17)

  • contracts/LibraryLock.sol
  • contracts/test/RinkebyDaiFaucet.sol
  • contracts/Ownable.sol
  • contracts/test/TestBundle.sol
  • contracts/CompoundAllocationStrategy.sol
  • contracts/test/StorageLayout.sol
  • contracts/IRTokenAdmin.sol
  • contracts/test/ComptrollerMock.sol
  • contracts/Proxiable.sol
  • contracts/RTokenStorage.sol
  • contracts/RTokenStructs.sol
  • contracts/Proxy.sol
  • contracts/ReentrancyGuard.sol
  • contracts/RToken.sol
  • contracts/IAllocationStrategy.sol
  • contracts/test/InterestRateModelMock.sol
  • contracts/IRToken.sol

Part of Reserve’s security record

Reserve
Audits4 audits by 4 firmsLast audit Mar 2026, by Oak Security.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open Reserve’s security record

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Quantstamp

236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026

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