Audit · firm’s term: security review
Cairo Security Clan reviewed AVNU (security review avnu) on 30 Jul 2024: 5 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 3 |
In the orchestrator contract, the entry point function execute_batch can only be called by a whitelisted caller address. The list of traders is passed to the function, which loops through each trader and calls initiate_order_execution to retrieve the input token from traders. Then, it executes a list of arbitrary calls to perform the swap. This design assumes that users trust the whitelisted callers. If the whitelisted callers act maliciously, they can steal funds from any trader by including calls that retrieve funds and transfer them away. The recommendation is to consider whitelisting the address and selector that the contract is able to call.
In each dca order, the trader specifies the total input token amount and the amount to swap per cycle. If the total amount is not divisible by the per cycle amount, the last cycle swaps less. However, initiate_order_execution always tries to swap the per cycle amount, potentially swapping more than the specified total. The recommendation is to add a check to ensure token_from_amount is divisible by token_from_amount_per_cycle.
The execute_batch function accepts token_from and token_to addresses and loops through traders to retrieve funds. There is no check that token addresses in traders' orders match the addresses passed by the caller. Invalid tokens might get stuck in the contract. The recommendation is to check token addresses in traders orders match passed addresses.
The report gives no description here.
When execute_batch is called, the list of traders is passed. The function loops through traders to retrieve funds and then sends swapped tokens to the trader addresses. There is no validation that the trader address owns the order contract. Callers can input arbitrary addresses to receive funds after swapping, effectively stealing from traders. The recommendation is to validate that trader.address matches the owner of the order contract.
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Repository and files the report names (7)
18 projects reviewed · 26 reports · latest Oct 2025
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