REX.

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed bsc-rex.io (REX.) on 20 Sep 2022: 26 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged, 5 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen bsc-rex.io’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings26

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High500
Medium002
Low0514
HighCentralization Risk in REX_AIRDROP.solOpen

The `TOKEN_DEFINER` of the contract `RexAirdrop` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - provides the address of `REX_CONTRACT` through `initRexContract()` - sets the claimable amounts per address through `initClaimables()` - revokes access through `revokeAccess()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `TOKEN_DEFINER` may allow the hacker to provide the address of `REX_CONTRACT`. and set the claimable amounts.

HighCentralization Risk in REX_DEX.solOpen

The `TOKEN_DEFINER` of the contract `RexDEX` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - provides the address of `REX_CONTRACT` through `initRexContract()` - revokes access through `revokeAccess()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `TOKEN_DEFINER` may allow the hacker to provide the address of `REX_CONTRACT`. The `REX_CONTRACT` of the contract `RexDEX` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - offers a stake through `listStake()`

HighCentralization Risk in REX_RDA.solOpen

The `TOKEN_DEFINER` of the contract `RexDailyAuction` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - sets the address of `REX_CONTRACT`, `TREX_TOKEN`, `LP_TOKEN` and `UNISWAP_PAIR` through `initRexContract()` - revokes access through `revokeAccess()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `TOKEN_DEFINER` may allow the hacker to provide the address of `REX_CONTRACT`, `TREX_TOKEN`, `LP_TOKEN`, and `UNISWAP_PAIR`. The `GAS_REFUNDER` of the contract `RexDailyAuction` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - withdraw any tokens from the contract after the contract has ended through `withdrawTokensAfterContractEnd()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `GAS_REFUNDER` may allow the hacker to withdraw any tokens from the contract after the contract has ended.

HighCentralization Risk in REX_REX.solOpen

The `TOKEN_DEFINER` of the contract `RexToken` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - sets the address of `AIRDROP_CONTRACT`, `RDA_CONTRACT`, `DEX_CONTRACT`, `TREX_TOKEN` and `UNISWAP_PAIR` through `initRexContract()` - revokes access through `revokeAccess()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `TOKEN_DEFINER` may allow the hacker to provide the address of `AIRDROP_CONTRACT`, `RDA_CONTRACT`, `DEX_CONTRACT`, `TREX_TOKEN`, and `UNISWAP_PAIR`. The role of `AIRDROP_CONTRACT` and `RDA_CONTRACT` of the contract `RexToken` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - mints tokens to any address through `mintSupply()` - create a stake through `createStake()` The role of `DEX_CONTRACT` of the contract `RexToken` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - restore a stake through `restoreStake()` - create a stake through `createBoughtStake()`

HighCentralization Risk in REX_TREX.solOpen

The `owner()` of the contract `TREX` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - renounces ownership of the contract through `renounceOwnership()` - transfers ownership of the contract to a new account through `transferOwnership()` - creates `amount` tokens and assigns them to `msg.sender` and increases the total supply through `mint()` - saves the airdrop amounts after deployment through `initClaimables()` Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `owner()` may allow the hacker to create tokens and save the airdrop amounts after deployment.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (5)

  • REX_REX.sol
  • REX_TREX.sol
  • REX_DEX.sol
  • REX_AIRDROP.sol
  • REX_RDA.sol

Part of bsc-rex.io’s security record

bsc-rex.io
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open bsc-rex.io’s security record

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