BOSagora - EL

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed BOSagora (BOSagora - EL) on 9 Jun 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen BOSagora’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium101
Low010
MediumInconsistency Via Out-of-Order EIPs Leads To `ethOpen

Repository: - agora-el Commit hash: - [`b313d5358345f55bbc4e79b05904b5782227353f`](https://github.com/bosagora/agora-el/tree/b313d5358345f55bbc4e79b05904b5782227353f) Files: - agora-el/core/vm/operations_acl.go - agora-el/params/config.go The coordination of EIPs that rely on the ctx block number is lax within EVM stacks. Within the output of `makeCallVariantGasCallEIP2929`, there exists a risk of value overflow. ```go func makeCallVariantGasCallEIP2929(oldCalculator gasFunc) gasFunc { return func(evm *EVM, contract *Contract, stack *Stack, mem *Memory, memorySize uint64) (uint64, error) { ... gas, err := oldCalculator(evm, contract, stack, mem, memorySize) if warmAccess || err != nil { return gas, err } // In case of a cold access, we temporarily add the cold charge back, and also // add it to the returned gas. By adding it to the return, it will be charged // outside of this function, as part of the dynamic gas, and that will make it // also become correctly reported to tracers. contract.Gas += coldCost return gas + coldCost, nil } } ``` This vulnerability opens up the possibility of a targeted attack scenario where a specific gas value is strategically provided to the `CALL` operation through the stack. By also requesting the maximum memory allocation, it could trigger an overflow in the resultant return value of `makeCallVariantGasCallEIP2929()`. This overflow could potentially lead to a situation where the `CALL` operation is undercharged inadequately, allowing for the allocation of the full 128GB memory capacity. It could easily lead to out-of-memory issue on the targeted serving node. References: - [*geth-out-of-order-eip-application-denial-of-service*](https://iosiro.com/blog/geth-out-of-order-eip-application-denial-of-service) - [*core/vm, params: ensure order of forks, prevent overflow #29023*](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/29023)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (51)

  • beacon-chain/node/node.go
  • config/features/deprecated_flags.go
  • beacon-chain/p2p/peers/scorers/block_providers.go
  • params/config.go
  • beacon-chain/execution/check_transition_config.go
  • validator/accounts/accounts_exit.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/IMultiSigWallet.sol
  • beacon-chain/p2p/peers/status.go
  • cmd/validator/slashing-protection/slashing-protection.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/IMultiSigWalletFactory.sol
  • runtime/tos/tos.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/BIP20/IBIP20.sol
  • cmd/prysmctl/validator/cmd.go
  • validator/accounts/accounts_helper.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/MultiSigWallet.sol
  • config/params/config.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/LoyaltyToken.sol
  • cmd/prysmctl/checkpointsync/download.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/LYT.sol
  • core/state_transition.go
  • cmd/clef/main.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/BIP20/IBIP20DelegatedTransfer.sol
  • cmd/validator/accounts/accounts.go
  • eth/downloader/skeleton.go
  • beacon-chain/state/stateutil/eth1_root.go
  • beacon-chain/core/altair/epoch_precompute.go
  • beacon-chain/state/state-native/state_trie.go
  • cmd/validator/wallet/wallet.go
  • cmd/validator/flags/flags.go
  • config/features/flags.go
  • eth/sync.go
  • cmd/validator/main.go
  • beacon-chain/p2p/peers/scorers/service.go
  • beacon-chain/core/altair/attestation.go
  • validator/client/service.go
  • beacon-chain/core/altair/block.go
  • core/state_processor.go
  • consensus/beacon/consensus.go
  • cmd/prysmctl/weaksubjectivity/checkpoint.go
  • beacon-chain/rpc/service.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/MultiSigToken.sol
  • packages/contracts/contracts/Reference.sol
  • packages/contracts/contracts/BIP20/BIP20.sol
  • beacon-chain/blockchain/merge_ascii_art.go
  • config/features/config.go
  • cmd/geth/main.go
  • miner/worker.go
  • agora/block_rewards.go
  • packages/contracts/contracts/BIP20/BIP20DelegatedTransfer.sol
  • packages/contracts/contracts/MultiSigWalletFactory.sol
  • consensus/clique/clique.go

Part of BOSagora’s security record

BOSagora
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Jun 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open BOSagora’s security record

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