Alaya - AlayaTraining

CertiK19 Mar 2024Files named in the report

Audit

CertiK reviewed Alaya AI (Alaya - AlayaTraining) on 19 Mar 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 6 open.

No open critical findings

Open the report Open Alaya AI’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Open	Fixed
Critical	0	0
High	0	1
Medium	1	0
Low	5	0

HighCentralization Risks in AlayaTraining.solFixed

In the contract `AlayaTraining` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-db31-37465260-bdbc-81b1b14bbc28/diagrams/centralization_AlayaTraining-AlayaTraining-_owner.svg) - `init(address addr)`: Resets the user's count in `userList` to 0. This function can only be accessed by the owner of the contract. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-db31-37465260-bdbc-81b1b14bbc28/diagrams/centralization_AlayaTraining-Ownable-_owner.svg) - `renounceOwnership()`: Leaves the contract without an owner, making it impossible to call any functions protected by the `onlyOwner` modifier anymore. This function can only be accessed by the owner of the contract. - `transferOwnership(address newOwner)`: Transfers the ownership of the contract to a new account (`newOwner`). This function can only be accessed by the owner of the contract. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project.