World of Dypians - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed World of Dypians (World of Dypians - Audit) on 29 Nov 2024: 6 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen World of Dypians’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium001
Low201
HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

In new commit `bcf3c5fa7729f1f59aa9fbf42288f7a36362088e`: All of the `WoD` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project. ```solidity=704 constructor(uint256 MAX_SUPPLY_TOKEN) Ownable(msg.sender) { MAX_SUPPLY = MAX_SUPPLY_TOKEN; _mint(msg.sender, MAX_SUPPLY_TOKEN); } ```

LowMissing Checks On Function `addVestingWallets`Open

The function `addVestingWallets` adds wallet addresses and allocates tokens for vesting but misses input validation: - It does not ensure that the `_holder` and `_amountToClaim` arrays are of equal length. - It fails to check that the addresses in `_holder` are unique. - It does not verify that the total of `_amountToClaim` does not exceed the contract's token balance. These shortcomings could lead to invalid or duplicate addresses being added or more tokens being allocated than the contract holds, causing potential logical issues. ```solidity=931 function addVestingWallets(address[] calldata _holders, uint[] calldata _amountToClaim) external onlyOwner { ```

LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FOpen

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • Contracts/WorldOfDypians.sol
  • Contracts/Vesting.sol

Part of World of Dypians’s security record

World of Dypians
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open World of Dypians’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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