Labrado - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Labrado (Labrado - Audit) on 17 Oct 2022: 11 findings, 1 critical; 4 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 6 open.

1 critical finding, fixed
Open the reportOpen Labrado’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High010
Medium000
Low603
HighCentralization Related RisksAcknowledged

In the contract `LabradoRouter02` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_LabradoRouter02-LabradoRouter02-admin.svg) In the contract `LabradoFactory` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_LabradoFactory-LabradoFactory-admin.svg) In the contract `LabradoPair` the role `factory` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `factory` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_LabradoPair-LabradoPair-factory.svg) In the contract `LabradoPair` the role `routers` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `routers` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_LabradoPair-LabradoPair-routers.svg) In the contract `Excalibur` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_Excalibur-Excalibur-_owner.svg) In the contract `LabradoToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/45b7966d4f85489c8c95f255c3e44403/diagrams/centralization_LabradoToken-LabradoToken-_owner.svg) In the contract `LabradoBaseNFT` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the following functions. - `setBaseUri()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `LabradoBaseNFT` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the following functions. - `mint()` - `mintByBatch()` Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `LabradoOperator` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the following functions. - `setSupportTokens()` - `setSupportNfts()` - `setOperatorWalletTokens()` - `setOperatorWalletNFTs()` - `pause()` - `unpause()` - `withdrawTokensStuck()` - `withdrawAllTokensStuck()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `LabradoOperator`, the users' tokens and native tokens will be stored in two wallet accounts, `operatorWalletTokens` and `operatorWalletNFTs`. Any compromise to the `operatorWalletTokens` account and `operatorWalletNFTs` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (29)

  • contracts/Excalibur.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/LabradoFactory.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/interfaces/ILabradoCallee.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/BitMath.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/LabradoLiquidityMathLibrary.sol
  • contracts/LabradoOperator.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/interfaces/ILabradoLP.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/interfaces/ILabradoRouter02.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/interfaces/ILabradoPair.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/LabradoRouter02.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/Babylonian.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/SafeMath.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/interfaces/ILabradoRouter01.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/libraries/Math.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/libraries/UQ112x112.sol
  • contracts/LabradoToken.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/interfaces/IERC20.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/LabradoOracleLibrary.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/LabradoPair.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/LabradoLibrary.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/libraries/SafeMath.sol
  • contracts/LabradoBaseNFT.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/FixedPoint.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/TransferHelper.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/interfaces/IWETH.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/interfaces/ILabradoFactory.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/interfaces/IERC20.sol
  • contracts/DEX/periphery/libraries/FullMath.sol
  • contracts/DEX/swap-core/LabradoLP.sol

Part of Labrado’s security record

Labrado
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn that report, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Labrado’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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