Quantstamp reviewed Strata (Strata - Discrete Accounting) on 26 Mar 2026: 2 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
`getOracleRate()` calls `oracle.latestRoundData()` but only validates that `answer > 0`. It does not check the `updatedAt` timestamp for staleness. If the custom aggregator v3 feed stops updating, the strategy would continue using a stale rate for all conversions, affecting deposits, withdrawals, `totalAssets()`, and NAV calculations. The oracle updates by Midas are infrequent, occurring around every 2-5 days, so a staleness threshold should be chosen with some headroom. Note that the overloaded `totalAssets(latestNav, timestamp)` does check `updatedAt` against the accounting timestamp, but `getOracleRate()` which is used in `convertToAssets` and `convertToTokens` for all other operations does not.
When `MidasCooldownRequestImpl.request()` falls back to `redeemRequest()`, the proxy sets `pending = true` and stores only an expected amount, but it does not persist the external request identifier. If a Midas admin later cancels the redemption request (`RedemptionVault.rejectRequest()`, `MidasCooldownRequestImpl` has no status check or cancellation path to clear local state, so `pending` remains true and future `request()` calls revert.
In the current implementation of the `MidasCooldownImpl` proxy contract, a user is unable to recover their funds if the Midas protocol fulfils their withdrawal request with less than 90% of the expected value. In this scenario the `finalize()` function will always revert until at least 90% of the `requestedAmount` of `baseAsset` tokens are present in the contract. This means the only way for a user to successfully recover the funds in this scenario would be to transfer the necessary amount of `baseAssets` into the contract to reach the `requestedAmount` value, unlocking the `finalize()` function and allowing them to redeem the contract's entire `baseAsset` token balance.
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