Babybonk

CertiK9 Jan 20241 address on BNB Chain

Audit

CertiK reviewed Baby Bonk (Babybonk) on 9 Jan 2024: 9 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 5 open.

No open critical findings

Open the report Open Baby Bonk’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Open	Acknowledged	Fixed
Critical	0	0	0
High	0	1	1
Medium	0	0	0
Low	5	0	2

HighCentralization Risks in BabyBonk.solFixed

In the contract `BabyBonk` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - steal fees and marketing funds, - update the sensitive settings of the project, and therefore disturb the normal functions of the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-a99c-fce4f600-809e-3b7f620b0a09/diagrams/centralization_BabyBonk-BabyBonk-_owner.svg) In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-a99c-fce4f600-809e-3b7f620b0a09/diagrams/centralization_BabyBonk-Ownable-_owner.svg)

LowThe `enableTrading()` function sets DEX pair withFixed

The `setPair()` function is designed to update the `uniswapV2Pair` only when the `pairSet` is false. In contrast, the `enableTrading()` function sets `uniswapV2Pair` without checking the `pairSet` flag.

LowThe `walletToWalletTransferFee` is locked if `_toFixed

If `walletToWalletTransferFee` is nonzero, a transfer fee will be applied when transferring BabyBonk between wallets. If both `_totalFeesOnBuy` and `_totalFeesOnSell` are set to zero, the `swapAndLiquify()` and `swapAndSendMarketing()` processes will not be triggered. Consequently, the charged `walletToWalletTransferFee` will be locked in the contract.